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INLUCETUA
Light on Dark Subjects
The back cover and the inside back cover should tell
you everything you need to know about the sponsorship of
this issue. We are, as we so often find ourselves, indebted
to the Lilly Endowment, Inc., for the funding which helps
our best ideas come into fruition. The Lilly Fellows
Program in Humanities and the Arts is one of the best of
those, we think. This special issue of The Cressel allows us to
participate in the Program, and thus extend to our many
readers the news and deliberations of a number of
thoughtful people now associated with it.
The articles assembled here are closely related to two
meetings, held during the academic year just ended. A
significant feature of the Lilly Program is the Network, and
the Inaugural Conference for these network schools, held
in October on Valpo's campus, provided such fine papers
and presentations that we felt a wider audience should
benefit from them. More than fifty representatives from
twenty-five Christian colleges and universities across the
country met for the three days of intense discussion of the
conference topic, "Christianity and the Academic
Vocation." Keynote speakers Lawrence Cunningham,
Frank Burch Brown and Sallie McFague provided the
sparks, and the resulting conversations, formal and
informal, were correspondingly warm. Some of that
response we have endeavored to capture here.
I personally regret that the exceptionally fine
experiences involving musical and visual arts, and the arts
of worship, cannot so easily be printed up and sent around
for your enjoyment Worshipping together at Evensong in
the Chapel of the Resurrection provided a dimension
rarely present at professional meetings, and demonstrated
as clearly as anything else the sense of a "body" of Christian
teachers.
A second conference, "The Integration of Faith and
Learning," co-sponsored by Baylor University, with the
assistance of Academic Vice-President Donald
Schmeltekopf, took place in April and involved a number
of people from Texas schools. The pieces in this issue by
Wolterstorff and Schwehn were both presented at this
occasion.
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The excited participation in both these meetings
proved, though we had little doubt of it, the truth that
teachers and administrators of Christian institutions of
higher learning are poised for a new era. Though there is
agreement that each denominational heritage will give
different shapes to the educational experience at Calvin, or
Goshen, or Luther, there is no longer much hesitance
about claiming that heritage. Most of us are, at the very
least, trying to discern what is worth claiming.
Defensiveness about the idea of Christian education
seemed old fashioned.
Among the many fruitful outcomes of these meetings
is a renewed and invigorated sense of how much we can
contribute to one another. For a long time, we in the
Christian academy have tended to listen for clues about
our task from several sources, but loud among those voices
have been the resonant tones of the secular institutions
whose leading role in the academic world has been largely
unchallenged. We have listened to our church
constituencies (admittedly to greater and lesser degrees),
and to our students and alumni, but we have rarely listened
to our special colleagues--our sisters and brothers--in the
enterprise about which we care so deeply.
"Values" is the hot word, certainly. Giving that word
more than mere media spin will require all the stamina,
imagination and intelligence we in the academy can
summon up. The matters discussed in these pages should
help The Cressel's readers, a hardy group surely, in that
summoning. The issue is crammed with words, and lacks
some of the width of subject interest we more ordinarily try
to provide. For its wealth of thoughtfulness and insight, it is
a long, hefty issue to put into your stack of summer
reading. May your reading therefore be as rich as the
material, and may it assist in sending you into your work
refreshed and renewed.
Peace,

GME
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GLADLY WOLDE HE LERNE
AND GLADLY TECHE:
THE CATHOLIC SCHOLAR IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM
Lawrence S. Cunningham
The task to which I have been appointed is to talk
about the future of the Catholic scholar or, more precisely,
where those scholars are to come from and if they come,
will they gravitate towards our Catholic schools. I use the
word "gravitate" advisedly because my hope would be that
our schools will have an attractive and pulling power and
not because the alternative to teaching at a Catholic school
would be working as night clerk at a convenience store.
I intend to honor the spirit of that task but my hope is
that my remarks would be mutatis mutandis applicable to
the Christian college more generally. Therefore I will more
often than not simply use the adjective "Christian" but will
speak out of the experience that I know best, the Roman
Catholic one. Furthermore, at this stage of things we cannot reflect on the future without somehow having the number 2000 flash on and off in our heads. It is for that reason,
and not for any apocalyptic purposes, that my title uses the
word "millennium."
In fact, my suspicion is that long before we reach that
new millennium-less than a decade from now-we will be
sick to death of savants, pundits, and prognosticators looking into that time and telling us with varying degrees of certainty what is ahead. In my mind's ear I already hear the
quiet beat of word processing keys as numberless authors
and would-be authors already work on millennia! tomes of
every stripe.
I have a personal reason for looking to the future and
it is, bluntly, that I will have less of it than many here precisely because I have so much of the past. This came to me
forcefully four years ago when I left Florida State University
to come to Notre Dame: The dreaded wheel of time had
turned! A pert young lady came up to me after class with
Lawrence Cunningham is Professor of Thology and chair of the
department at Notre Dame University. He regularly reviews religious literature in Commonweal, and has wrilllen extensively on
Catholicism and literature, and was a founding member of the
International Thomas Merton Society. This paper was given at the
Inaugural Conference of the Lilly Fellows Prgram Network at VU
in October of 1991.
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greetings from her mother whom I had taught when she
was a senior and I had just begun teaching. Despite my
interior rationalization (she was a senior and I had not
even finished my Ph.D.; that she had married young and I
had entered the classroom young) I was not happy. Such
thoughts could not shield me from what, borrowing freely
from a poet, I call intimations of mortality.
There is a further, more professional, reason to take
stock now, not because of the near changing of the dial to
2000 but because in my own tradition (Roman Catholic)
and in my own field (theology) some profound changes
have taken place over the past generation. Those changes
are so dramatic that even in the midst of them we feel the
difference, although what those changes portend is still not
clear.
Let me give you some instances of those changes
since they are part of the background for this paper. Everything I will note here has happened within my own professional memory in those years immediately following upon
the closure of the Second Vatican Council in 1965.
• In one generation, the study of theology in the
Roman Catholic Church in this country shifted decisively
from seminaries to universities. The pedagogical orientation, as a consequence, has equally shifted from the predominant mode of training priests for the ministry. In fact,
many Roman Catholic seminaries today accept lay students
and provide various training programs in the ministry. The
major loci for the serious study of theology today has moved
decisively to the university or, in a few instances, to consortia
of theological faculties with loose attachments to universities.
To understand how recent this shift of theology to the
university is, we might note the startling fact that there was
no department of theology at Notre Dame until about
1960, and no graduate education in Catholic theology until
the mid 1960s when the first real Ph.D. program was developed by Bernard Cooke at Marquette University:
• Increasingly, those teaching theology in Catholic
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universities are not priests, but are lay persons of both
sexes. Furthermore, they frequently come with excellent
educations from schools that are not Roman Catholic. The
recent hirings at the assistant professor level at my own
institution are instructive in this regard: Of seven recent
appointments at the junior level, only one is a priest
(trained at Berkeley's Jesuit School of Theology) while six
are graduates of Chicago, Yale, Duke, and Harvard. Furthermore, these teachers do not mold themselves on the
seminary model of priest-professors who lived with their
charges and served both as instructors and spiritual guides
and shapers of religious vocations-which was the case with
seminary professors.
One consequence of the above is that the presumptive wholeness of Catholic theological education-with its
insistence on a background in classics, followed by a major
emphasis in scholastic philosophy, culminating in a full
course of theology and its allied disciplines-has been fractured beyond repair. In fact, that education was often
shabby and second-rate even though it had as its beau ideal
a holistic vision which went under the somewhat romantic
notion of "Christian humanism." Even those training for
Holy Orders today do so without any presumption that they
will have a degree in philosophy (much less any Latin)
when they begin their course in theology. Indeed, some
candidates for the ministerial degree (the M. Div.) require
more than background in theology; they require some
rudimentary catechesis since their educational backgrounds are so varied.
• Just as the profile of the teaching personnel in
Catholic schools changes and has changed, so also the
recipients of that teaching have changed: Not only are
there more lay persons (and increasing numbers of
women), but many enter the study of theology without
ministerial or pastoral goals in mind. Furthermore, in
some of the leading institutions of theological education
outside the Catholic tradition in this country, Catholics are
increasingly a large part of the denominational spectrum,
just as Catholic scholars are more represented in conspicuous teaching and research positions in those same institutions. If there has been one place where the ecumenical
movement has borne fruit, it is in the cross-fertilization of
theological education in those schools which still attemptwith varying degrees of success-to maintain a denominational identity and a fidelity to their own vision of the
Christian tradition, while, at the same time, seeking to be
representative of the Christian tradition in a manner not
restricted to a particular denominational strain. (A fuller
account of these changes is given in articles by Thomas
O'Meara, Robert]. Wister and Gerald O'Collins in America,
3 February, 1990.)
• The core identity of many Catholic institutions of higher
learning is historically rooted in the charisms of the religious communities which founded them. From these communities have come not only teachers and administrators,
but rectors of residence halls, campus ministers, coun-
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selors, and so on. These communities not only provided
personnel, but a particular angle of vision as to what an
education might be; thus, to cite a conspicuous example,
an education based on the Jesuit ratio studiorum. Furthermore, these religious communities reflected in their lives a
model of spirituality-not only because of their insistence
on religious values, but in the atmosphere they provided
on the campus in everything from the liturgical life which
they sustained to the art and architecture which advertised
their presence and reflected their view of the Christian life.
Unless there is a dramatic demographic shift, that
rootedness in the spirit of a given religious community will
erode over a very short period of time, at least in terms of
the presence of personnel. For colleges sponsored by religious women that erosion is in its final stages already, while
for those schools sponsored by religious men the erosion is
well underway; in both cases it seems monodirectional.
I note this erosion not with glee because only God
knows the true heft of the contributions made by generations of self-sacrificing religious who lived exemplary lives
of dedication and service to higher education. I note it,
however, with some emphasis because to do otherwise is to
indulge in a nostalgia for something that current trends do
not allow us to recover, and further because this shift has
forced clear-minded people to think creatively about how
the particular charism of their founders must be reconceptualized for the future needs of both the institution and,
more generally, for the larger constituencies of both
church and society.
To this point, my remarks have tended to focus on
theological education in the Catholic university and the
religious character deriving from the founders of institutions. It is at this point that a caveat needs to be raisedone that has already been part of the extensive commentary on the problems of the religiously affiliated
college/university. The warning is this: I do not wish to
define the religious character of an institution solely in
terms of the presence of a theology department and a core
of religious who may have founded an institution. That is,
as we will see, a "fall back" position which does not address
the real issues.
This is not to deny that a robust liturgical life on campus is important. Nor is it to deny that a vigorous theology
department is essential. Indeed, the temptation to turn
theology into the more bland designation of "Religious
Studies" is, in my estimation, a retreat for religiously sponsored schools. I would suggest that a theological faculty,
dedicated to the Christian tradition in general and serious
about its own denominational heritage in particular is an
essential part of the self-identity of a denominational
school. Religious Studies as an encompassing field may
well be appropriate for a secular school, but theology is a
discipline, and its absence from the curriculum of a religious school is, in my estimation, an abdication of responsibility.
If an institution is religiously identified only because
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it so designates itself as such in its mission statement (no
matter how earnest the prose) and because it offers bland
religious instruction where Hinduism is no more privileged
than Christianity as part of its core requirements and
because it offers a menu of worship opportunities through
an office of campus ministry, there is no guarantee that it
will remain a religious institution except in the self understanding of its officers, theologians, and chaplains. It may
provide a certain comfort to those committed to the religious vision (and, let us be honest, it may serve the development office well as it appeals to those potential donors
and parents who remember an earlier time and an earlier
esprit) but it could ( I did not say "must") be what Sigmund
Freud called religion tout court: an illusion.
The reason why this could be the case is that, apart
from the vision of the central administration (and the fact
that the same administration is the keeper of the purse), it
is really the faculty that sets the tone of the institution. The
faculty is, in essence, the universitas which has (or, in many,
cases does not have) the vision of what an institution is and
how to be a part of it. The obverse is also true. If, for example, all hirings are systematically made on the basis of the
desire for academic luminaries and no consideration is
given about how such people fit into the larger community,
what happens very quickly is that the larger institution
becomes merely an administrative umbrella for the atomized labors of individuals or those entrenched duchies
known as departments and programs.
And the fallout is equally obvious: The autonomous
units not only do not share, but ignore or patronize the
mission statement as boilerplate; campus ministry becomes
just one more office in the extra-intellectual life of the
school less important than, say, food services. Meanwhile
the obligatory courses in religion/theology can be benignly
dismissed as doing "no harm."
If this negative scenario, outlined above, is a plausible
one, then it seems obvious that were we to wrestle seriously
with the question of from where future teacher /scholars
for religious schools will come, we could not do so in terms
of the nurture of this or that person as a discrete individual. The issue must be conjoined to the larger issue of how
nurturing institutions presently understand themselves as
seedbeds for their successors. We must, in short, think of
the university as a community of learning with a common
vision ofwhat (Christian) education is.
Some schools will have an easy time of it in this
regard. If an institution is so explicitly identified with a religious worldview that commitment to that worldview is a sine
qua non of employment or attendance, there is no problem-as long as there is a constituency upon which to draw
both students and faculty. Within this category I would
have in mind schools like Yeshiva University, Brigham
Young, Calvin College, Wheaton, and others which are
strong bearers of a given tradition. Their problems are not
those of religious identity as much as problems of institutional inbreeding and that temptation to sectarianism.
6

Other institutions have strong denominational traditions and actual presence but have become, for a number
of reasons, more pluralistic in response to a number of factors. Let me use my own school as a case in point, since we
should be obedient to the dictum of speaking about that
which we know best.
Notre Dame advertises itself in its literature and mission statement as a "National Catholic research university."
That it has a national constituency is a fact. That it is a
research institution is a devout wish which is inching
toward fact. That it is Catholic is more than a fact, at least
in the popular mind; the mythos of Notre Dame haunts
American Catholic popular culture, and the artifacts on its
campus are suffused with a kind of Catholicism which is traditional while-at least according to some of its more vocal
critics-is either patriarchally oppressive (say some of its
younger, lay, female, faculty) or dangerously modernist
(say some of its older faculty and alumni).
Let us assume that for the foreseeable future the student body will be mostly Catholic (today nearly 90 percent
of the undergraduates are; the percentages diminish a bit
at the graduate level, reaching 50 percent in a few of the
professional schools, like law), as are a representative percentage of the faculty. Here is the problem: When one
wishes to recruit, say, graduate professors in science and
technology, what does one do when the available pool not
only does not include a large number of Catholics but comprises persons who, given the givens today, are more likely
to be Sikhs, Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists than Christians or
Jews?
And further: What happens as the number of religious persons who join the faculty in the various schools
dries up along with the drying up of the same religious who
traditionally served at every level of the institutional life
from the central administration to resident directors in the
dormitories?
Who knows the answers to these questions?
What does seem to be clear is that the "Catholic character" of an institution like Notre Dame is in a state of
flux-a flux which is recognized by the university as a
moment in which new and different ways of thinking are
imperative, lest the university feed on a mythos which is
rapidly becoming part of history rather than being a regnant dynamic giving shape to what we are and what we
want to be.
The kinds of problems I have sketched out above are
not meant to be of the hand-wringing variety, but to be a
sober overview of what seems to be the current situation.
To say that the study of theology has undergone a paradigmatic shift, or that the personnel structure of certain institutions is changing, or that pluralism is becoming a reality
in the faculty is not to say that Catholic education is in a
state of decline. It is only to say that it is changing.
The plain fact of the matter is that, despite change
and the need for self-identification, every indication is that
there is an enormous clientele in this country for schools
The Cresset

which provide a coherent education rooted in ethical and
religious values. We should ponder the fact that in our
major cities, parents--especially minority parents of limited
means--make enormous sacrifices to send their children to
religious schools, not only because they are seen as "better"
(in some material sense, they are not often better) but
because they believe that their children will receive a holistic education that gives them hope for a better future as
well as a disciplined atmosphere in which to receive that
education. There is no reason why this attractiveness
should not carry over to post-secondary education if we are
alert enough to maintain that heritage in the face of
counter pressures from the Zeitgeist. Which leaves me then
with two large questions to address: First, what is the
"Catholic character" of a college/university broadly understood? and second, how does a Catholic school nurture its
future teacherI scholars?

THE CArnouc CHARACTER oF HIGHER EDuCATION
On August 15, 1990 Pope John Paul II issued an
apostolic constitution on Catholic Universities under the
title Ex Corde Ecclesiae. It was a document whose arrival was
not anticipated with eagerness because of the many rumors
that it would be a retrograde instruction, demanding
greater ecclesial control over Catholic institutions of higher
learning. The earlier actions of the Holy See against theologians in various universities lent credence to the
rumors. It was with an immense sigh of relief that most of
us read the actual text, since the rumors of intolerance and
control proved, in fact, to be just those-rumors. Evidently, the interventions of Catholic educators (especially from
countries with a strong tradition of academic autonomy)
had borne fruit.
Ex Corde Ecclesiae is divided into two parts: the first a
schematic reflection on the nature and mission of Catholic
universities, the second dealing with certain general norms
relative to the relationship of Catholic universities to the
Holy See and to the local bishop.
According to the apostolic constitution a school worthy of the name Catholic should exhibit four general characteristics-characteristics which I would say are unimpeachable and fundamental:
1) A Christian inspiration not only of individuals, but
of the university community as such.
2) A continuing reflection in the light of the Catholic
faith upon the growing treasury of human knowledge,
to which it seeks to contribute its own research.
3) Fidelity to the Christian message as it comes to us
through the church.
4) An institutional commitment to the service of the
people of God and of the human family in their pilgrimage to the transcendent goal which gives meaning
to life. (I.A.l5 in the translation published in Origins
on October 4, 1991)
The papal insistence that the university community
be Christian in inspiration does not mean that non-Chris-
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tians are unwelcome on the faculty or among the students;
this would hardly be appropriate for a church which sponsors colleges and universities in lands where Christians are
a decided minority (e.g. Sophia University in Tokyo).
What it does mean, as the document spells out in other
places, is that members of the community should at least
be supportive of the general self identification of the institution and that a majority of the faculty be de facto committed to the Catholic faith.
Wisely, the norms do not spell out what the term
"majority" means, since cultural and national differences
will only define the term. It would be easier to mean majority as numerical majority in a country like Ireland or
Poland, whereas elsewhere majority might mean something
like a "critical mass" or a "core community." The document
is quite explicit, however, that the mission statement and
Catholic character be spelled out for everyone, so that
those who would fmd it an impossibility to live within those
parameters might not be beguiled into thinking that the
educational philosophy of the institution is unimportant.
The most significant and promising of the four principles enunciated in Ex Corde Ecclesiae is the fourth one:
that there be an institutional commitment to the service of
the people of God and to the entire human family "in their
pilgrimage to their transcendent goal which gives meaning
to life."
What that characteristic endorses, in fact, is a
renewed commitment of the church to the kind ofincamational theology energized by the Second Vatican Council
(especially in its reflections on the church in the modem
world-Gaudium Et Spes) and, following on that, a commitment to the union of Christian belief to the needs of this
world. There is, in short, an endorsement to the strategy of
defining Christian life not solely in terms of orthodoxy, but
as that orthodoxy finds expression in orthopraxy. It is, to
put it in a negative formulation, a warning against seeing
the Christian message as totally counter-cultural (although
it is surely that in part), sectarian, and world-denying.
A full reading of Ex Corde Ecclesiae would give no comfort to those who would like to see the Catholic university
or college as a bulwark against the world. It is not to be
something that is only counter-cultural. On the contrary, it
insists that not only should the university be in dialogue
with modern culture and contemporary research, but it
should add to its store and, also, learn from it. In a section
affirming that the university is part of the larger attempt at
evangelization (the term in contemporary Catholic usage,
despite what we hear with American ears, is not a synonym
for proselytization), it is instructive to see how the pope
describes the specific gift that the university makes towards
that end; let me quote his words:
"... research carried out in light of the Christian message which
puts new human discoveries at the service of individuals and
society; education offered in a faith context that forms men
and women capable of rational and critical judgment and con7

scious of the transcendent dignity of the human person; professional training that incorporates ethical values and a sense
of service to individuals and society; the dialogue with culture
that makes the faith better understood and the theological
research that translates the faith into contemporary language ..." (1. B. 46).
Permit me to juxtapose one other, briefer, description of the work of a Catholic university which also has the
ring of the generality to it:
"There are two aspects of a university. The first and most evident is that it has to do with culture, with knowledge, with use
of the intellect. The second, not so evident, is that it must be
concerned with social reality-precisely because a university is
a social force: It must transform and enlighten the society in
which it lives." (Sobrino, 149)
Those sentiments, so seemingly banal on the page,
were written by Ignacio Ellacuria, the rector of the Catholic
University of Central America in El Salvador, seven years
before he, five other Jesuit professors, and two Salvadoran
women, were murdered on the campus of that school by
the Salvadoran military who found the notion of a university as a "social force" an abhorrent one.
I cite Ellacuria not to dramatize but to illustrate how
the conjunction of Christian inspiration and a sense of the
university as a social reality takes on vividness in certain situations. It is not a question of the "Social Gospel"; it is a
question of how the Gospel becomes incarnate in a specific
setting (the university/college) and within a particular context: that of learning, teaching, and research across the
curriculum.
Seen from that perspective, we might also have an
entry into the issue of the nurturance of future teachers for
the Christian school without automatically thinking that
this can be done by educating only theologians/chaplains/ church professionals or persons who are formed in
the Christian tradition so that we can call them "good practicing Christians" who also happen to be economists or
chemists.

NURTURING THE CHRISTIAN TFACHER/SCHOLAR

This is not a new issue in Roman Catholic higher
education. In the late 1920s, three Jesuit institutions
(Creighton, Marquette, and St. Louis) had a plan to subsidize the doctoral studies of selected young men with a view
that they would come back to their sponsoring institutions
in order to teach for a designated number of years. As
recently as two years ago, an article appeared in America
(March 17, 1990) proposing an umbrella organization that
would undertake such enterprises as summer institutes to
gather top graduate students for colloquia as a precise
instrument of recruiting faculty. Doubtlessly, other strategies may have been advanced in other quarters.
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My intention is not to suggest such tools, but to deal
more broadly with the context in which such strategems
might work.
On this issue I have one broad generalization to make
and some specific examples and reflections to flesh out the
generalization. The generalization is this: We will produce
teacher /scholars for Christian schools only to the degree
that our present form of education allows students to see
that their own faith commitment can be translated into a
way of living that is consonant with, and integral to, their
desire to be professionals in their chosen field of study,
and, further, that Christian schools will be supportive of
their desire to grow in that fashion both when they are students among us and, later, when they join us as peers in the
academic world.
There will always be a few persons who, having finished their graduate education, will gravitate to churchrelated institutions simply because they feel comfortable
there and sense that their personal religious life will be
nurtured in such an environment. That is a worthy desire
and schools who fmd such people, assuming their competency, are blessed with their presence. Schools can count
on such persons, but they make an unreliable available
pool from which to build and sustain a faculty.
The real challenge is to do something a good deal
more creative. Let me give you an example not as an
imitable model but as a way of thinking creatively.

A few years ago, with seed monies given by the Jesuit
community, Boston College inaugurated on its campus the
Jesuit Institute. (I am grateful to Robert Daly, SJ. for his
generous help in describing the work of the Institute which
he now heads.) The purpose of the Institute is to attack a
range of problems, both intellectual and social, from the
vantage point of the Christian tradition exemplified by the
Jesuit charism. The work of the Institute is various:
• Small grants are given to scholars to work on a specific topic . One such grant allowed a faculty person at a
small liberal arts college to work on a values-centered curriculum for undergraduates. Another allowed an Indian
scholar to study the problems of integrating "Scheduled
Caste" persons into the sociopolitical life of a region in
India.
• Cross-disciplinary seminars are held with BC professors from various departments focussed on a specific topic
(e.g. philosophers, theologians, and physicists are working
on the theology of creation in the post-Einsteinian period).
• Visiting scholars are brought to the campus for a
semester to work upon an agreed topic with the expectation that they will contribute to the ongoing life of the
Institute.
The merit of such a program is that it demands collaboration across disciplines, thereby encouraging people
from diverse fields to focus on a given issue within the
broad contours of the Institute's philosophy. It further provides an image of how collaborative work can be done, and
allows that work to be done in an amiable setting.
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The Jesuit Institute (one can think, likewise, of the
Notre Dame Peace Institute or other similar ventures)
requires money, personnel, and support. It is not something every college or university is able to do and there is
no suggestion here that it should be done in this manner
or on such a scale. Where it can be done, however, it bears
striking witness to a commitment to an incarnational theological vision of higher education. Such experiments exhibit a faith in the notion that people can work across disciplines on real human problems with an impetus derived
from faith commitment.
What one can deduce more generally from efforts
described above, however, is useful and more widely applicable. If a Christian school takes the adjective seriously,
then the ways that school selects areas of study and
research should reflect that appellation. It would not be
out of the question, for instance, to insist that the business
faculty emphasize the value of small ventures in
entrepreneurship as a vehicle for social reconstruction
rather than simply stamping out business clones to serve in
corporate America. It would not be unthinkable to look for
people in education, architecture, or planning who would
be interested in the social well-being of society at large
rather than simply training people for the job market.
Christian schools need not necessarily lust after every academic fashion in the liberal arts, but might think of ways to
give students some sense of the Christian critique of culture as well as the cultural critique of Christianity.
I would not see such strategies as forms of crypto
proselytization, but as coherent and defensible moves to
insure that the values of our inherited tradition impinge on
the education of our young across a wide spectrum of studies.
There is another point. Many of our students do not
fully appreciate how privileged they are to enjoy the fruits
of higher education. In many cases they have no concept of
the sacrifices their parents and sponsoring institutions
make in order to allow them a place in a college. One way
in which they can get both some sense of this generosity
and a way of paying it back is through a period of volunteer
service. One of the things I find most attractive about
Notre Dame is its emphasis on encouraging volunteer service while its students are on campus and its commitment
to fostering the idea of extended volunteer service for its
recent graduates. Volunteerism, grounded critically in the
Gospel, is a most apt form of diakonia for institutes of higher education.
I do not hesitate to use the hackneyed word "edifying" when I think about the young men and women whom
I have taught over the past few years who have gone on to
work with handicapped persons in the L'Arche communities, or those who are workers with the Hospice movement,
or those who have become volunteers with the Catholic
Workers, or those who make longer commitments to work
in the poblaciones of Latin America. While some may be
motivated by adventure or even a hidden superiority deriv-
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ing from noblesse oblige, most, I think, volunteer because the
explicit philosophy of Notre Dame sets out a vision of
incarnational Christianity to which students can respond.
The university also uses strategies to correlate this volunteer work with the students' academic work so that those
who do volunteer work while on campus can then reflect
critically on that service through selected courses offered
under the aegis of the theology department.
Notre Dame is hardly unique in the cultivation ofvolunteerism. It is probably encouraged on most U.S. campuses, and even more intensively at those schools which have a
religious character. Such efforts are not only valuable as
capstones to an undergraduate education but are seedbeds
for the nurturance of future teacher-scholars for our
schools.
On what basis would I make that claim? Fundamentally, what some amount of service offers is a complex of
learning experiences which are interconnected and
unavailable in the classroom. First, there is the perspective
one gains from seeing the world from the angle of those
who suffer or are deprived or in some kind of need. Second, there is the chastening lesson that one is only beginning, rather than completing, one's education-the thirst
for more learning (I am thinking of graduate education
here) is an often underappreciated by-product of service.
Third, there is the primordial gratitude (I can think of no
other word) towards an institution that does something
more than merely serve as an intellectual filling station,
pumping in data, theories, and bibliographies. These ends
are most often obtained when there is some concerted
effort to provide classroom experience along with the volunteer service.
It is that last point, I think, which deserves some
emphasis. When an institution commands not only the loyalty of its alumni, but an admiration for what that institution does intellectually and culturally and what it stands for
in terms of its religious commitment, there is every reason
to hope that graduates will feel inclined to come back to
their alma mater or a similar school in order to be part of
its ongoing work.
That "coming home" of graduates is what I had in
mind when I adorned the title of this paper with the
famous line of praise that Geoffrey Chaucer utters in the
Prologue to The Canterbury Tales where he describes the
poor scholar who spends all of his money for books and
who, in gratitude, prays and works in honor of the benefactors who gave him an education. That scholar had been
nurtured on learning and formed to think of the academic
life as being hospitable for both the learner and the teacher-who, ideally, are often one and the same person. That
scholar saw the academic life as a way of living rather than
merely a way to make a living; a way of "lerning" and a way
of "teching."
If, in the future, we are to have a regular pool ofwelltrained academics who will commit themselves to the Christian college, it will only be because we have provided them,
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in their formative years, with a sense of vocation and a
model of how a Christian intellectual might profitably
spend his or her productive academic years. That will
demand that we value economists, psychologists, chemists,
and others not as an apologetic proof that Christians can
also excel (a sure sign of intellectual inferiority), but
because our institutions are able to say that here at this
school there is a place for one to do one's best work precisely as a mature Christian intellectual. We need to foster
intellectual vocations, not merely intellectual careers.
Those who wish a religious refuge will always be ready
to "come home" to the parent institution; if one wishes a
faculty that fully and adventurously reflects the mission of
the school, the conditions must be such that those who
could go anywhere would still wish to "come home "
because they see a chance for a holistic development as a
scholar and believer and, equally, they will feel that they
can contribute to something more than mere careerism.
Alasdair Macintyre, at the end of his provocative work
After Virtue wrote:
What matters at this stage [of our history] is the construction
of local forms of community within which civility and the
intellectual and moral life can be sustained through the new
dark ages which are already upon us. And if the tradition of
virtues was able to survive the horrors of the last dark ages we
are not entirely without grounds for hope. This time however
the barbarians are not waiting beyond the frontiers; they have
already been governing us for quite some time. And it is our
lack of consciousness of this that constitutes part of our
predicamenL We are waiting, not for Godot, but for another--doubtless very different-SL BenedicL (264)
I am not sure I fully share Macintyre's pessimistic
diagnosis of our culture and I am surely not suggesting that
colleges/universities take on a monastic cast. I do quite
agree, however, that culture is served by hospitable communities that cultivate intellect and virtue. I would further
suggest that Christian colleges/universities have within
their historic tradition the philosophical and theological
resources to ideate and sustain a sense of common intellectual and spiritual purpose. I would also argue that they
have the "location" to foster an intelligent kind of spirituality that nourishes both the spirit and the mind.
The great challenge, of course, is to utilize those
resources in such a way that genuine community of purpose becomes actual. To the degree that is done we can
hope for the future of our institutions and, more to the
point of our conference, their attractive power in drawing
young scholars to join in and further redefine the work of
those institutions If, on the other hand, we fail to articulate and implement any coherent vision of Christian education, we will be just another educational enterprise competing in the marketplace for money, students, and personnel
who are looking for the best deal open to them. That, I
submit, is not a happy prospect to contemplate.O
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Professor Tom Buford, Furman University,
responds...
In his rich and provocative essay Professor Cunningham discusses two problems facing many Christian colleges, their Christian identity and the uncertain supply of
Christian teachers. An important theme running throughout his discussion is the significance of a pluralistic faculty
for Christian colleges.
What is bothersome about this trend toward a pluralistic faculty? It is not only the internal strain such a pluralism places on the identity of a college. We may best understand it as the problem it presents for students, who,
preparing the mselves as intellectual professionals with a
coherent, holistic view of life find themselves in a colllege
which says it stands for a Christian world view and yet surrounds them with teachers who profess and live lives that
have no relation to Christianity and who may actively repudiate it.
In the face of the trend toward pluralism Cunningham asks two important questions: where will Christian faculty members come from, and will they gravitate to Christian colleges? However, he believes these questions can be
adequately dealt with only by examining two prior questions: what is the Catholic (or generally Christian) character of a college or university, and how does that institution
nurture its future teacherI scholars?
Cunningham answers these questions by appealing to
a framework within which a college can legitimately call
itself Catholic and on the basis of which it can attract Christian scholars. Such colleges can attract and hold Christian
scholars only if they translate the faith into a way of living
consonant with the students' desire for both professional
development and religious growth throughout their lives.
But can we follow Cunningham's lead? If we sharpen
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the issue we will see that this framework, though attractive,
may not help us very much. Let me explain. Let's assume
that a college identifies itself as Christian and that it has
already moved along the path to a pluralistic faculty. It cannot retrace its steps; many of the non-Christian faculty are
on tenure, and many of their interests are firmly set in the
curriculum. Its only option is find some satisfactory way to
live with a pluralistic faculty. But if it chooses to do so it
must allow the interests of that pluralistic faculty to find
their way into the education of the student. But can it do so
and the college remain Christian? Consider pluralism and
its impact on a Christian college, particularly its faculty and
education of its students.
How can we construe pluralism? Ernst Cassirer pointed out fifty years ago that an important characteristic of the
twentieth century is that there is no generally agreed upon
ultimate principle, body of knowledge, or power (such as
the power of reason) to which all of us ought appeal in settling disputes among competing goods to determine which
is correct. His point is clearly illustrated by the contest
between goods and justice. Many goods are available to
people in our society (Christianity is only one among _
many), and there is no way to disallow opposing goods
except on grounds of justice. Each proposed good has a
right to be heard and acted upon just so long as it does not
violate assumed principles of justice. And when it does,
our only recourse, according to a scholar like Stuart Hampshire, is to appeal to procedural justice to decide whether
our view of substantive justice is too narrow or the proposed good is unjust. The flourishing of competing goods
refereed by procedural justice is an instance of an open,
pluralistic society.
We can now consider the impact of pluralism on a
Christian college. First, the faculty. As a Christian college-following the lead of a pluralistic society-becomes
more and more open to opposing viewpoints, the faculty
will reflect that openness. And as the faculty becomes
more pluralistic and professionalized it is likely to be composed of fewer Christians than non-Christians. Cunningham is well aware of this. But let's look at it more closely.
The college, in preparing students for careers, acts as
a credentialing agency for them. In turn it submits to the
credentialing agencies for its own faculty: graduate
schools, professional organizations, and publishers of professional books and journals. The college hires that person
who best measures up to the criteria required by her professional discipline. And those criteria have little or nothing to do with other goods such as one's religious persuasion. The researcher who has one eye cocked on the standards of the profession, the other on his research project,
may be blind to teaching students. A case in point is Cunningham's example of hiring the best chemist who is also a
Hindu. The significance of this for the college is that as
goes the faculty, so goes the college . As the faculty
becomes more professional and religious persuasion is secondary, it is likely the faculty will become predominantly
non-Christian. With a more professionalized faculty and
with less emphasis on one's religious persuasion, a strain
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will be felt between the identity of the college and the faculty which does not accept that identity. When that strain
arises, the college is susceptible to shifts in its moral-religious self-understanding. That strain must be addressed if
a college is to be Christian in Cunningham's sense.
Next, the student. A Christian college organized on a
pluralistic model must guide the student to her/his career.
The students we teach live in a pluralistic world, and they
need to find their way in it. We can see how pluralism
manifests itself in the growth and development of careers.
Since the latter part of the nineteenth century, careers
have become increasingly important for Americans, who
see them as the principal way to make a good living and to
gain security for one's family. And as Christian colleges
prepare the young for careers, they attempt to do so within
the framework of a Christian world view. But that is not
easy. Credentialing societies and professional organizations set standards by which a person's career entrance is
screened and performance is evaluated. The professions
become endless paths of routinized, rationalized behavior
that have no view of any larger moral context beyond their
own ends. In addition, careers change; some fall by the
wayside and others come into existence. Both carriagemaking and computer design show us this truth. As the
institutions of our society change, so do the routes our people follow to earn a living and take care of their families.
It is clear how a professional in computer science can help
a student become a professional in computer science. But
if that professional is not Christian, it is not clear how she
can help the student translate the Christian faith into a way
of life consonant with the student's desire to be professional.
What, then, are we to make of Cunningham's vision?
Though we have only noticed the impact of pluralism on
the development of professionalism among faculty and students, we have seen enough to recognize that Christian colleges which take the path of pluralism must carefully think
through their vision. Cunningham articulates four characteristics to which a Christian college must subscribe if it is
to call itself Christian. What is not clear is how those principles will help colleges which have taken the pluralist, professionalized path to remain Christian. How will adopting
those principles help the college to reconcile the splinteredness of faculty professionalism and student careerism?
How will those principles guide a modern student to the
holism and coherence for their career-driven lives that
Cunningham rightly believes they need and want? Those
questions must be addressed by colleges if the education of
modern young people is to be informed by the Christian
faith. Cunningham has provoked us to think about what
we are doing. And I hope he will tell us more.O
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Dean Jon Moline, St. Olaf College,
responds ...
Lawrence Cunningham has expressed with great clarity some of the major parameters of a problem faced by colleges like my own. I will attempt to expand upon a small
part of what he said, following his admirable model by
drawing upon the institutions and traditions I know best. I
will say a few words about the origins of the problem of
recruiting appropriate faculty for our colleges and offer a
few ideas that have helped me deal with it.
I write this not simply as a dean of a liberal arts college of the church but as a long-term professor in and
chair of a graduate department in a large doctoral institution. I have many friends in that institution and in others
good people who do not fit the picture I must now paint.
Their courage and strength in swimming against the prevailing currents merit our respect and gratitude. Even
those who fit this picture do so, in my experience, not out
of malice but out of ignorance and a very human failure to
confront the comfortable prejudices they have been
taught. There are many decent people among them.
Every liberal arts college that calls itself Christian, or
church-related, or, as St. Olaf does, rooted in the Gospel,
faces the tension between what it officially stands for and
what most graduate school professors have encouraged
their new Ph. D's to stand for. Prudence in a buyer's market will lead many such candidates, if pressed, to mumble a
few words about "values," "respect for all traditions", "spirituality", or even "the tradition of my parents", but evidence
of Christian or indeed any religious commitment or identity is unlikely to emerge. The experience of most graduate
students is that such an identity is strongly discouraged,
and not many withstand this discouragement. If we are to
fill most of our open faculty positions with candidates who
have any interest in our mission and identity, we must
recruit people who rise above their graduate educationcandidates who are, to some extent, traitors to their training. Let me expand on this.
With some wonderful exceptions, graduate school faculty members in the major doctoral institutions have a certain contempt for what our colleges do and also a certain
contempt for what we stand for. The contempt for what we
do extends across many disciplines, and is founded on the
priority we place upon undergraduate teaching, an activity
that in graduate institutions is notorously ill-rewarded and
often assigned the lowest priority. Teaching undergraduates well is correctly seen as giving of oneself, and the level
of generosity found in graduate institutions is relatively
modest.
Even in graduate teaching the fulfillment is less likely
to be seen in giving of oneself than in receiving new
insights from advanced students who are one's peers or,
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ideally, better than one's peers in their narrow sub-specialties. A particular graduate student is valued most for what
that student can discover and convey to professors. It is not
far off the mark to say that in a graduate program, it is difficult to resist the notion that to give is less blessed than to
receive. Office doors are usually closed to undergraduates
who might wish to receive additional help, although they
might open for graduate students, especially the better
ones.
The primary teaching aim of most graduate school
professors is to clone themselves--to produce students who
will continue to produce excellent if not definitive scholarly studies and carry on the dynasty in which the Doktorvater (or Doktormutter) stands. The production of such
studies requires a great deal of time, and that time is to be
found principally in graduate institutions or in research
institutes. To produce a student who wishes to teach in a
liberal arts college is usually viewed as failure or at best as a
temporary expedient for that student in a difficult job market. Students who actually aspire to work under conditions
that will preclude their fulfilling their professor's ambitions
for them tend to be written off as hopeless. The students
who have this wish-if they are tolerated at all-are viewed
as having second-rate minds, since the first-rate minds are
assumed to gravitate to lives of the most intense and uniterrupted scholarship as soon as possible. The question they
are asked is, "When will you ever find time for your own
work if you go there?" The idea that teaching undergraduates could be anyone's own work is totally alien.
The contempt for what our institutions stand for in
graduate institutions is most common in the humanities
and behavioral sciences. Its roots are ideological and
almost aesthetic. To produce a student who has the temerity to be a Christian in an age in which this is politically
incorrect may be viewed as a failure, especially if the student wishes to nurture like minds in a church-related college. To produce a student whose faith leaves him or her
still happy and non-cynical is to produce a student who is
likely to be thought to be out of touch with reality precisely
for that reason-if the reason is known. That this attitude
toward the good news of the Gospel is uninformed and
shallow in its roots escapes detection because there can be
little serious discussion of the actual merit of religious
claims under laws requiring separation of church and state
or of rigid customs that conceive of faith and a rich intellectual life as incompatible.
It is not surprising that graduate students nurtured in
such an environment can easily emerge with attitudes, values, and misconceptions that are ill-suited to the careers we
provide for our faculty members. Nor should it be surprising to us that the grace of God nevertheless allows some
candidates to pass through the graduate school gauntlet
relatively unscathed. Often these are people who were fortunate enough to have done their undergraduate work in
our institutions. As undergraduates they have seen good
teaching by people who cared about them. As graduate stu-
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dents they have been able to recognize and diagnose the
unhappiness of graduate professors, and they may have
seen part of the human cost of these professors' choices to
their families and friends.
Recently a first-rate candidate spoke in an interview of
her graduate school professor's environment, saying, "I
don't want to live like that. I have a lot to give to students; I
like seeing undergraduates' eyes light up over the things
they are learning. I want to raise a family, too, and my husband and I are seeking a life with more wholeness. We
know we can't find it except in a college of the church."
Perhaps her Doktormutter has written her off as a hopeless
drudge, never to be heard from again in the pages of the
top refereed journals. But she is exactly the sort of person
our institution needs to carry out its mission. She believes
that her children and ours deserve what Lawrence Cunningham termed, "a holistic education that gives them
hope for a better future as well as a disciplined atmosphere
in which to receive that education." And she is splendidly
prepared to help provide it.
This young woman is not alone. She is not, however,
Lutheran. That does not concern me very much. If it were
not for serious Christians who are Roman Catholic, Baptist,
Methodist, Reformed, Presbyterian, etc ., we could not
begin to survive as both a high-quality liberal arts college
and a college of the· church. Lawrence Cunningham mentioned that much that is distinctive in his church's past is
apparently going or gone and unrecoverable. The same is
surely true in other churches as well. This is not all loss.
The cultural isolation, prejudice, ethnic hostility, nationalism, and lack of dialogue with fellow-Christians that
marked the instituitional past of many church bodies is on
its way out as we gain a clearer sense of who our real
friends and enemies are. Increasingly our common faith
unites us more than our embarassing history divides us.
And our common faith can bring us together to discover
ways to sustain and nurture through graduate school the
future of faculty members we all need. One helpful step is
to consult Christians on the graduate faculties. They do
exist, and by asking one another we can find them.
Finding the appropriate candidates for our faculties is
partly a matter of asking them the right questions--questions that will, if answered honestly, uncover signs of contempt or signs of respect for what our institutions do and
what they stand for. Each dean will have worked out ways of
doing this. I use a patterned interview that starts with questions about what the candidate likes about teaching. The
interview continues with questions about what the candidate aspires to give to undergraduate non-majors that will
continue to be of value to them throughout their lives. If
the idea that there is anything to like about teaching or the
idea that one should be giving anything to mere nonmajors seems alien to the candidate, this is a telling sign.
The interview also explores the candidate's views and comfort level regarding our rootedness in the Gospel.
Finding appropriate candidates is not just a matter of
asking the right questions, however. There must be people
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who can give appropriate answers with conviction. These
seem to come largely from institutions such as those participating in the Lilly Fellows Program. I am profoundly grateful for the other Christian institutions that continue to prepare some of their finest graduates for doctoral study, graduates who by the grace of God emerge a few years later as
people ready for the vocation that is possible in our colleges. But in the end nothing less than a reform of graduate education will suffice to meet our college's long-term
needs. As major employers of the products of graduate
schools, we should find ways to insist on their producing
what we need. 0

Professor Tammy Reid,
Whitworth College, responds ...

It was the evening after we'd heard Lawrence Cunningham. Eight of us from the Lilly conference on Christianity and the Academic Vocation, all from different
church-related institutions, were having dinner and talking
about what we have in common. Conversation ranged
across curriculum and budgets, students and faculties,
when eventually talk turned to hiring. The tone turned
wistful-or was it my imagination? "We try to hire Christian
faculty, but the applicant pools just aren't large enough."
"It's a real problem trying to find a Christian Physicist."
"We used to hire Christians, but we've gotten away from
that now, and it's like swimming upstream to go back .... "
Different speakers phrased comments differently, but
their thrust was the same. These faculty and administrators
were from various parts of the country-urban and rural
settings, East Coast, Midwest, West Coast-and their stories
were similar. They were intensely interested in discussing
Christian higher education, thus their presence at this conference. But their observations lead in one direction: Faculties at church-related institutions are increasingly secular.
I'll return to this conversation in the latter half of my
response to Cunningham's article.
For me the heart of "Gladly Wolde He Lerne ... " is the
description of promise inherent in a Christian faculty. The
assumption is that for an institution to go beyond being
church-related (read "established-by and used-to-have-tiesto") to being communities of Christian believers, the faculty must nurture students to the extent that these same students catch the vision and "come home" (a wonderful
phrase!) to carry the torch.
This is the part of the speech that made me want to
stand and applaud, which sent me back to my own campus
determined to remind faculty that the very future of our
college is in their hands, and by extension, the hands of
their students. Yes, Christian educators bring different eyes
to the teaching-learning enterprise. To mention a few
resulting differences, they believe in the wholeness of ere-
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ation, and so they see the connectedness of curriculum.
They see endless possibilities in their students. They believe
in the meaning below the meaning of what is taught. Contrary to the popular secular view of Christian higher education, they believe in challenge and questioning-after all,
didn'tjacob wrestle with the angel? Hasn't the god of the
Old Testament legitimized the struggle, and the god of the
New Testament provided the grace for those gaps when
we're too apathetic to struggle? The college of believers,
then, is freed to wrestle intellectually, and to conceptualize
the process of higher education along lines that differ qualitatively from our secular colleagues.
For Cunningham to say that we must provide our students with a model of how a Christian intellectual lives life
is right on target. If Christian faculty truly bring the added
dimension of God's truth to their teaching and scholarly
tasks, if they live out Augustine's credo et intelligum (I believe
that I might know), that very integration of intellect and
faith becomes a compelling catalyst and magnet for the
young people with whom we work. The ethos created by
the community of teachers and learners who, as Cunningham says, "sustain a sense of common intellectual and spiritual purpose" is a potent force.
Chaucer's clerk, Cunningham reminds us, has
motives that are pure as he pursues the scholarly life he saw
lived out by his mentors. Today's Christian faculties are
also capable of motives that are pure-and certainly the
recruiting power of these communities in action will be terrifically appealing to the students.
Now all we have to do is to provide the Christian
scholars who will engage in this enterprise. And therein lies
the rub. I'm reminded of another pilgrim who travelled the
Canterbury road with the Clerk-the Monk. The Monk
belonged to an order emphasizing contemplation, work,
and study. Yet Chaucer depicts him riding far from the
monastic fields and study tables, with fine hunting dogs
and horses, dressed for adventure. The Monk's interests,
though quite appropriate for other men of his day, lead
him at cross purposes to his station in life.
Cunningham's intent is to vest the future of churchrelated colleges with the next generation of Christian
scholars .... but from whence will they come? If indeed the
crux of the matter is that they will be clones of current
scholars, it won't happen. Because the number of Christian
schools hiring Christian faculty is declining. Maybe it's
been a desire for public funding. Maybe it's been the result
of graduate school biases for "unfettered" pursuit of knowledge. Maybe it's been the evolving pluralism of the American public. Whatever it's been, there are a number of clues
to indicate that the Monk left the fields to go adventuring.
Back to the dinner table in Indiana. My new-met colleagues from around the country were wistful when they
made their comments about the difficulty of hiring Christian faculty. They seemed somewhat sheepish, even apologetic, as they asked how my institution manages to hire
Christian faculty. It had never occurred to me that others
didn't. I found myself saying, "We always have .... " From the
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day 102 years ago when it was founded by Presbyterian minister George Whitworth, the college has recognized that its
destiny, to say nothing of its mission ("to educate the heart
and mind ... for Christian scholarship") is linked to the
beliefs of its faculty. Through the years, administrators have
never faltered in their goal to hire confessing Christians.
Not all Presbyterians. But all Christians. We don't sign
statements of faith, like some of our evangelical cousins.
Faculty represent a variety of church theologies: Catholic
and Protestant, mainline denominations and independent
churches. But we share the belief that this is God's world as
redeemed by Christ, that it's worthy of study, that knowledge is related, that human beings in God's image were
given minds as well as bodies, and that we can profit from
seeking truth together.
Judging by conferences my colleagues and I attend ,
there aren't a lot of institutions like us. Cunningham says
there are changes in Catholic education. He cites the
increase of lay teachers. But there's a broader change
across Catholic and protestant institutions alike-an
increasing number of professors are not Christian. They
profess values, certainly, but not theocentric values. It's an
increasingly secular world out there. The entire history of
American education has been the move from schools
founded by the church and taught by believers, to the secularization of education, and the positivist assumption that
truth, by definition, should be sought by objective means,
outside the lens of faith. The current manifestation of secularism is nowhere more apparent then in the very nature of
the faculties with which we staff our Christian colleges and
universities.
If this is the case, then Cunningham's earnest
entreaty, his strategy for the very continuation of our institutions, i.e., that we nurture students who in turn will come
home, is in trouble. There's no one to do the nurturing.
And if, in fact, they do come home, they may very well find
that the house is empty. 0

Professor Elizabeth Morelli,
Loyola Marymount University, responds ...
Professor Cunningham outlines a trend in Catholic
higher education since the Second Vatican Council, the
problems this trend poses, and suggestions toward possible
solutions. The problems are not peculiar to Catholic universities and colleges; the issues these institutions face are
faced by many Christian institutions. As Cunningham
speaks from his own experience at Notre Dame, so I am
responding in light of my experience at Loyola Marymount. While I share this Catholic background, I am a
member of a philosophy rather than a theology department. Yet, both philosophy and theology have traditionally
been core departments in Catholic universities, and the
changes that Cunningham describes in the theology
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departments of Catholic institutions have their parallels in
the philosophy departments of these schools. Further, I am
responding not only as a member of a core department of
a Catholic university, but also as one of those 'seed-bed'
products-educated as an undergraduate in a Catholic university, trained as a graduate in a large secular institution,
attracted back to carry out my vocation in a Catholic university. (I have to admit that it is disconcerting to consider
that the specific course of my freely chosen destiny may
have been a desideratum of my educators all along.)
The current trend described by Cunningham is the
gradual but seemingly ineluctable erosion of the rootedness of Catholic institutions of higher learning in their
founding religious communities. It seems that he considers
this trend to be most evident in the changing nature of
how theology is taught and in the reduced presence of religious faculty on the campuses of Catholic universities.
While he assures us that he does not wish to define the
"religious character of an institution solely in terms of the
presence of a theology department and a core of religious
who may have founded an institution," he nevertheless
focusses on these two issues as central to the problematic
trend. As professionally-minded institutions adopt the fashion of treating religions as objects of social science, theology departments are transformed into religious studies
departments. As new faculty are hired solely for their scholarly promise and not with an eye to whether they understand or affirm the same founding vision and mission, the
religious nature of the university community is called into
question. Architecture, letterhead, and the memories of
alumnae can only sustain so much. The present threat,
then, is clear enough: "There is no guarantee that it [the
Catholic university] will remain a religious institution."
In the face of this threat posed by the current trend in
Catholic higher education, Cunningham formulates two
problems: a general problem of how to transpose the original vision of the religious founders, into the present ecclesial, social, and academic contexts; and a specific problem
of how Catholic universities are to continue to reproduce
their core faculty. He proceeds to address these problems
in light of Pope John Paul II's characterization of the
Catholic university in Ex Corde Ecclesiae. Of the four characteristics listed from that document, Cunnigham considers
them all to be essential, and the fourth to be the most significant and promising: "An institutional commitment to
the service of the people of God and of the human family.... " Cunningham concurs that a Catholic university must
promote not only orthodoxy on the part of its students, but
also orthopraxy. His conclusion is that the Catholic university should not be considered some kind of counter-cultural bulwark against the world. Rather it should be in constant dialogue with modern culture and contemporary
research. Our president of Loyola Marymount, Thomas
O'Malley, SJ. , recently expressed the same point in an
address to the faculty. If the Church is to continue to be a
teacher (through the Catholic university), she must also be
a learner.
Jum1992

Cunningham offers two practical suggestions for
meeting the problems outlined, for preserving and enhancing the central religious mission of the Catholic university.
The first is the creation of small, integrative, interdisciplinary institutes on the campuses of Catholic universities,
such as the :Jesuit Institute' at Boston College. From his
description, it seems that these institutes could meet a
number of the needs of the scholar /teacher committed to
the vocation of academic work in a Catholic university. I
wonder, however, if the presence of this kind of school
within a school addresses the problem of community in the
university. Undoubtedly, participating in such an institute
can be beneficial for those chosen to participate, and the
institute may serve as a catalyst for the university, but can it
meet the need for an integrative spirit in the university
community? Such promising enterprises should not forestall or replace efforts to create common purpose and
avenues of collaboration in the university as a whole.
The second suggestion offered addresses the specific
problem of the holistic education of students in a religious
institution. Cunningham cites the success of volunteer service organizations in providing opportunities for Christian
orthopraxy. He writes : "Many of our students do not fully
appreciate how privileged they are to enjoy the fruits of
higher education." He recommends a period ofvolunteer
service as a way to give students a sense of how they have
been blessed, and a real sense of what the gospel demands
of them. Involvement in the service organizations at Loyola
Marymount does engage our students in issues of social justice, and it seems to be personally edifYing for them.
I would hesitate, however, to 'institutionalize' such
volunteer service as a general graduation or core requirement. Many of our students come from disadvantaged
backgrounds themselves, and have to work late hours to
support themselves (and in some cases, their small children). Secondly, the imposition of 'self-sacrifice' on certain
self-centered students could easily foster the worst attitudes
on their part, the supercilious piety and inauthentic solicitude rightfully disdained by the recipients of 'charity.' Cunningham does not himself suggest mandatory volunteer
service in his paper. I am just warning about a danger I see
in the wholesale encouragement of our students to engage
in Christian social action. (There is a deeper issue, which I
have not the space to develop here, regarding the idea of
orthopraxy; namely, that it seems much easier for us to
agree upon what constitutes religiously and politically correct action, than for us to explore and reach agreement on
orthodoxy.)
Finally, I would like to suggest that a partial solution
to the problem of drawing our graduates back to work in
Catholic universities is to be found in the very trend that
poses the problem. The constitution of the faculties of
Catholic universities has changed over the last twenty to
thirty years. Insofar as the faculty are, in essence, the university, the Catholic university, in essence, has changed.
There are more lay faculty, and more women, and, increasingly, more married couples. Does the presence of such
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faculty present an obstacle to the nurturing of the Catholic
teacher /scholar? I think that, in fact, the contrary may be
the case.
Perhaps the influence with most impact on students
in their university experience is the faculty member as
model. Students encounter in their professors what it
means to try to make a devotion to intellectual creativity
central to one's life. Students on our campus witness professors who more or less gracefully manage to balance the
demands of research, teaching, university service, and community service. Further, they witness professors who are not
only meeting the competing and often conflicting
demands of being a scholar in Ernest Boyer's full sense, but
who are also juggling the competing demands of scholarship and parenthood. There is the theology professor who
carries his infant son in a baby backpack between classes,
and the two philosophy professors who take turns babysitting their little girls while the other spouse teaches. Last
summer, a whole family accompanied our students on one
of our summer abroad programs--the mother taught, the
father helped direct the program, and the two children
provided the glue for many of the social activities and
week-end trips. Students reported in their evaluations that
they learned the most on the trip from interacting with this
family and simply observing how this 'academic' family
lived together. I also suspect that a subtle dimension of
community is added to a univeristy, when students attending your class have just come from your husband's class.
Students seem to be especially sensitive to all the nuances
of interaction between colleagues who are spouses.
From the curiosity and responses of students over the
years, I have formed the impresssion that our students,
especially our women students, are positively hungry for
academic models. The great majority of our students will
have families and careers, with all of the practical, economic, emotional , and temporal conflicts and demands
involved. They learn from women and men scholars that,
first of all, it is possible to integrate into one's life a commitment to intellectual inquiry, to artistic creativity, and to
spiritual growth; and, secondly, that it is not only possible,
but rewarding to lead such a 'polymorphic' life. The creative project at the core of the academic vocation enriches
and 'makes light' daily practical burdens. The everyday
challenges of family life, conversely, provide needed liberation from the rigors of scholarship, and even material for
reflection.
In conclusion, I would like to add to those excellent
strategies outlined by Cunningham, the suggestion that we
acknowledge, affirm, and find means of supporting a new
and valuable resource in our midst. The faculty of the
Catholic
university
today
consists
also
of
scholar/teacher/working parents committed to the central
mission of the university, and capable of profoundly influencing our students through their example. 0
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And, finally, Professor Cunningham
concludes ...
I am very grateful to all the respondents for the critical care with which they listened to my argument. The hesitations and doubts they express are very much my own .
Since the paper was given, working with a group project to
frame the University's Mission Statement as we ready ourselves for the year 2000 and beyond, I have come to some
personal conclusions that are germane to issues raised by
my respondents.
The first is this: if a school wishes to retain its Christian character it must enunciate and maintain something
analogous to an "affirmative action" plan for hiring committed scholars in order to sustain a critical mass of faculty
who affirm and advance the vision of the school. This affirmative action must go beyond finding people who have the
appropriate religious background in order to recruit those
who have a sense of authentic commitment. To the degree
that this is not done, there arises a faculty consensus that
one will seek the "best" person with "best" judged by criteria that exclude or are indifferent to religious commitment. It is not a priori clear to me that it is impossible to
find first-rate teacher/scholars who are also religious committed. All appointments may not be made in this fashion
but no appointment should be made of a person who is
hostile to, or contemptuously indifferent about, the mission of the school. As Professor Morelli points out, the faculty serve as role models. If they do not model the mission
of the school, who will? And further: if they do not model
what the school is, it is unlikely that students will replace
them in the future.
Secondly, and not unrelated to the above, the Christian school must create a climate-or better, a culturewhich makes it desireable for people to want to come and
exercise their vocation as Christian educators. That means
that one should not mistake narrow tests of orthodoxy for
Christian commitment. It further means that the Christian
culture of a school not be a moralistic culture of repression
and reaction. There is a necessary riskiness in education,
and if we believe that our faculty is "where the Church does
its thinking" it needs space to make ,m istakes and fumble
around in the dark a bit. A defensively sectarian school will
attract only deferential sectarian faculty.
All of the respondents are aware of these issues and
struggle with them in one fashion or another. One need
only compare the reactions of Professors Buford, Moline,
Reid and Morelli to see how deeply they anguish over these
questions. The very fact that there are persons who do
anguish over the issue and are willing to enter into dialogue to seek solutions is fair indication that we will come
to the new Millenium with some degree of confidence that
the secular impusle is neither irresistable nor inevitable. 0
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THE PROFESSING TEACHER
Jill P. Baumgaertner

As I listened to Frank Burch Brown's presentation,
"Teachers, Mediums, and Magi: Christian Educators in
Humanities and the Arts," I began to realize that teaching
at Wheaton College has made me into a cultural anomaly.
"Most of us would be hard pressed to say just what it is
about teaching that could be distinctly Christian," Brown
said, and all I could do was to shift my gaze ever so slightly
so that I could see my Wheaton College colleague,
philosophy professor Arthur Holmes, and try to read his
reaction from the angle of his head. He was very still, and I
knew that this man, who has for many years been a
powerful and eloquent propenent of the integration of
faith and learning in the Christian liberal arts college, must
have been struck by the unintended irony in Brown's
statement. At Wheaton, Professor Holmes' special calling
has been to make sure that the faculty is hard pressedthat is, challenged to think intentionally about this issuebecause it is the very heart of the college's mission.
Daily during my twelve years at Wheaton I have been
confronted with the question implicit in Brown's
statement. Some of my friends-Christian friends-in
more secular groves of academe groan at the imagined
horror of it, suspecting that Muzak versions of "How Great
Thou Ar" are piped into Wheaton classrooms for a full five
minutes following the mandatory recitation of the Pledge
of Allegiance in which "one nation under God" is
In this essay, Jill Baumgaertner of YW!eaton College reflects on
tlu! presentation given by Professor Frank Burch Broum of Virginia
Polytechnic at the Lilly Fellows Conference in October, 1991.
Titled "Teachers, Mediums, and Magi: Christian Educators in
Humanities and tlu! Arts," his talk included recorded pictures and
sound from Mozart's The Marriage of Figaro, as well as a
recorded sampling of multiple sounds referring to tlu! ancient cry,
"De Profundis." The poem with which this essay concludes
appears by kind permission of tlu! Editor of First Things, where it
was originally published.
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pronounced with the smugness of those who know their
prayers will be answered even if their requests defy the laws
of the universe. This is not, of course, the way it is. But I do
admit that life in an evangelical institution is nothing I was
prepared for, even though I wanted very much to teach in
a Christian university after completing my graduate studies.
What is it exactly that I do in the classroom that is
different from my colleagues at other universities? In some
ways there is nothing different Teaching poetry writing of
the Renaissance literature is much the same, whether it is
at Wheaton or Valparaiso or University of Illinois. The
difference is that, ideally, at a Christian institution that has
attempted to preserve a religious credo, one should have
more freedom to express beliefs and make overt
connections between one's .faith and one's learning
without fear of giving offense or being dismissed as
parochial.

I stay at Wheaton not because it is comfortable for
me. Often, as a committed Lutheran, I find that it is not
But I appreciate the freedom I have there to be exactly the
person I am, with all of my intellectual and creative and
theological interests constantly in the process of being
shaped, challenged, and reshaped by the experiences I
have with students in the classroom. Something I hope our
students know by the time they are seniors is that one does
not have to be comfortable in order to be happy. When
they come to us as freshmen their snug worlds are smaller
and more narrowly defined, and the lines they have drawn
between good and evil are absolute. When they leave us, we
hope that they have learned to live less complacently. To
learn to live with ambiguity is to learn to be present for
one's own life, as Walker Percy would say.
Recently, thinking that a temporary change might be
beneficial, and very much wanting the experience of
teaching at a Catholic university, I applied for a one-year
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position at an east-coast school, which had advertised an
endowed chair in religion and literature. I interviewed for
the position on January 6th, a date with certain positive
connotations. But when I referred to the day as Epiphany,
the chair of the department had no idea what I was talking
about, and then I realized that the rules were once again
those I had learned in grad school when my Milton
professor had written at the end of my paper on the
character of Sin: "Be careful of the way you present your
ideas. You sound as if you might believe this." The college
interviewing me wanted a scholar in the area of religion
and literature, but not necessarily one who believed that
any of this stuff had anything to do with the way one might
live one's life.
One learns, as a grad student, how to abstract oneself,
how to achieve the appropriate objective stance, how to
dissociate oneself from the text. And it must be admitted
that Objectivity is an important goal for the scholar. I must
teach my comfortable freshmen to read with a cretain kind
of objectivity-the kind that will allow them to willingly
suspend their disbelief-so that their identities as
Christians will not obscure the texts they are exposed towill not allow them, for example, to summarily discard
Homer because he is a pagan. I see some of my colleagues
in other institutions fighting a version of this battle when
they are forced to argue that Sophocles is ok, even though
he is a dead white male.

We must clear away the garbage that has piled up around
us as academics, so that the texts themselves can speak to
us again-and to our students in the fullness of their
beings. This is what Frank Burch Brown did in his address
to the representatives of the Lilly network last fall. Without
preaching, without becoming reductionistic, he showed
how a Christian magus could teach Mozart's The Marriage of
Figaro as a redemptive work. He then went several steps
further. He created a recorded montage of the diverse
voices and musics of our multi-cultured world, and allowed
us to hear it with new ears, having just experienced the
redemptive power of Mozart's opera. It was from this
perspective impossible for the listeners to avoid the power
of art; it was impossible to jump immediately into
intellectual abstractions about it because the experience of
it pouring into our ears and spirits was first of all
mysterious and beautiful.
Notice what this experience was not. It was not
passive. It was exhaustingly energetic. It required the
teacher to be something of an artist-creating cosmos from
chaos, shaking us, his students, out of our passiveness and
complacency, making learning a dislocating experience
and a spiritual one.

18

I take very seriously this mandate to dislocate my
students. At an evangelical school I sometimes think my
real work is to pierce through the cliched and
sentimentalized religious veneer so many of my students
bring with them . Talking with freshmen from a public
university, I realize that this phenomenon takes another
form on other campuses where students often speak a
collection of politically correct slogans and cliches,
unaware of the tough issues they must confront if they
really dared to understand the meaning of the words they
were speaking. So with my students and for them I point
over and over again to the cross, to the violence of the
Kingdom of God, to the scandal that is the image of our
redemption, to the silence of God at Christ's final
despairing cries as he hung on the cross.
This can be profoundly disturbing and disorienting to
those who, in Flannery O'Connor's words, would like for
religion to be a warm electric blanket when instead it is the
cross. I notice that by the time my literature students are
seniors, they are no longer wearing little crosses hanging
from their earlobes. Why? I think-! hope-that it is
because they have, through the literature they have
studied, begun to realize that this business of being human
is both profoundly joyful and profoundly serious. They
have learned that joy can never be separated from
suffering. The cross has, somewhere and sometime in those
four years, acquired dimension and meaning. Perhaps it
has even taught them to take risks, to resist the trivial and
the tawdry, and to celebrate authenticity in all human
experience, including art.
Our students want us to show them that scholarship
and learning are more than just intellectual aerobics. They
want us to teach them how to read so that it matters. They
want us to help them put their learning into significant
contexts. We must teach not as cerebral automatons but as
spiritually-energized scholars, aware of our cultural and
theological biases, unafraid of attempting to integrate our
spirits and our intellects, all the while recognizing the
dangers of giving in to the seduction of the abstract, which
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has already become an insidious part of our natures if we
are (and we all are) university-trained scholars.
In Flannery O'Connor's story "Parker's Back, " Sarah
Ruth does not recognize the God she claims to know, even
when he appears to her as a tattoo on her husband 's back,
the Word literally made flesh. It is much more comfortable
for her to keep God distant and abstract, fleshless,
bloodless, untouched by human hands. Her husband,
Parker, receives the broom's blows as she beats him on his
fresh tattoo, the welts forming on his own back which is
now also the face of Christ. Parker has been transformed by
the picture on his back. But Christ has been transformed,
too, as he accepts Parker's suffering as his own.
We are changed by the works we read and teach, and
as Frank Burch Brown reminds us, the works themselves
are changed by our reading of them. If a person who has
been blind form birth suddenly sees, what can he see? Has
he changed or has the world he once knew as a blind man
changed? Just as Professor Brown offered his "meditative
postlude" to the Lilly representatives, I offer this poem. It is
as close as I can come to saying exactly what I mean.

Complex Phenomena
The rules of chaos are simple: A mountain
is never a perfect cone. A lake
is never really a circle. A drop
of dew is not a microcosm.
No. Flowers wither.
Dust collects. There is the
relentless return of what we
do not want. Everything inclines
to disorder. But then how to
explain this grove of orange trees
planted so close branch nuzzles branch,
the whole world in permanent rows?
An illusion, of course. When
the present for most of us lasts only
3 seconds. But then how to

explain the man blind from birth who
sees a person and believes he sees
a tree on legs? How did he fmd
the conceit to link such disparates?
The tactile vision of his past creates the
chaos of his present sightedness.
His world, newly angled, is no longer
reasonable, but still he relies on what
he knows. He names what he sees, revising
phylum, genus, class as he goes,
sometimes standing quite still, eyes closed
in order to recall the harmony of things.

Jill P. Baumgaertner
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THE ART OF REMEMBERING
NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF

Among the great paintings of Pieter Brueghel the
Elder hanging in the Museum of Fine Arts in Brussels is the
one titled The Census at Bethlehem. The painting represents
the episode, narrated in the second chapter of Luke's
gospel, of Mary and Joseph arriving at the village of
Bethlehem to have their names inscribed on the census roll
ordered by the Roman emperor. One sees Mary and
Joseph in the middle and right foreground of the scene,
Mary riding on a donkey being led by Joseph; back a bit, to
the left, people are standing around a table waiting to have
their names inscribed. The episode takes place among the
buildings and activities typical of a sixteenth century village
in Brabant. Some of the buildings in the village are in
ruins; scattered amongst the ruins are buildings under
construction.
In this essay I wish to reflect on how this painting, and
others of its sort, functions in human affairs. Of course, it
functions in many ways. Since the early days of
Romanticism, the expressive function of art has been
widely recognized, as has the aesthetic function. Indeed, a
good many theorists have gone beyond recognizing the
expressive function of art to attempt to ikfine art in terms
of its expressive function, as have a good many gone
beyond recognizing the aesthetic function to attempt to
define art in terms of that function. In addition to these
two functions of art, the cognitive function of art and the
imaginative function have also received extensive attention.
The Brueghel painting functions in all these ways. But in
this essay I want to discuss a function which, though of
fundamental importance, has been almost entirely
Nicholas Wolterstorff is Professor of Philosophical Theolog;y at
Yale Divinity School and current president of the Central Division
of the American Philosophical Association. Before going to Yale,
he taught for 27 years at Calvin College, one of the charter schools
in the Lilly Fellows Program Network. He is currently at work on a
book on john Locke and the emergence of •rationality. "
•This essay was presented as the C.S.Lewis Lecture at the Queen's
University of Belfast, as the Suarez Lecture at Fordham University,
and at the Lilly Conference at Baylor University in April, 1992. I
wish to thank the auditors at all three of these occasions for
exceptionally lively discussions and helpful suggestions." NW
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neglected by our theorists of art. I shall call it the memorial
function--more specifically, the social memorial function.
Art, I suggest, is one of the means by which a community
keeps alive its social memory.
I will limit the focus of my discussion in two ways.
Since all communities have a social memory, and since all
of them, so far as I can tell, use art as a means of social
memory, I could conduct my discussion by ranging widely
across communities in my analyses and examples. I have
decided, instead, to focus my analysis on the Christian
community, and to take my examples from it. In part I do
so because this is the community directly relevant to
understanding the Brueghel painting; in part, also, because
I know this community well. But most important: the social
memorial functioning of art proves unusually rich in the
Christian community. Let me emphasize, however, that my
main points will be applicable to all communities; my
intent is to illuminate the social memorial function of art
in communities generally-in religious communities, in
national communities, in academic communities, etc.
Secondly, instead of ranging over all the arts, I will focus
most of my analysis on twCKJimensional visual art, and take
most of my examples from it. Much of what I say will quite
obviously hold for the arts in general; but my discussion
will be less diffuse if I focus just on two-dimensional visual
art.
I
The Christian church is a community spread out
across space and stretched out through time. It is stretched
out through time because it has a tradition. A community
has a tradition by virtue of handing things down from one
generation to the next, and by virtue of the next
generation receiving and keeping in mind what was
handed down-in other words, by the next generation
remembering what was handed on to it. Handing on and
social remembering are two sides of the one coin which is
tradition.
It will be useful to distinguish three components
within what the church in particular, and communities in
general, hand on and remember. The :tradition of the
church has, for one thing, an interpretive component; in the
case of the church this component consists of an
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interpretation of God and Jesus Christ, of the world and
history, of human experience and obligation. Central to
this interpretive component is a certain way of interpreting
Scripture. But the interpretive component of the church's
tradition, in all the diverse versions of that tradition, always
goes beyond an interpretation of Scripture. Interpretation
of Scripture is caught up within a broader interpretation of
reality, experience and responsibility, in one way or
another grounding that broader interpretation. What is
handed over and appropriated constitutes, one might say, a
vision of meaning.
Secondly, what is handed over and appropriated in
the church and any other community includes a certain
way of expressing its mode of interpretation, a certain way of
embodying its vision of meaning. It incorporates a style of
life-a style of thinking and feeling, a style of organizing
institutions, a style of art and worship, recreation and
comportment, a style of disciplining and expressing the
emotions, a style of coping with disagreements. Perhaps I
should here call attention to the fact that the
interpretation and the expression which the church hands
on and remembers not only come in many different
versions-Catholic, Orthodox, Lutheran, Reformed,
Anabaptist, Pentecostal, Pietist, etc. but are always
influenced, to a greater or lesser extent, by the
interpretations of reality and the expressions thereof which
are current in general society.
There is yet a third component in the church's
tradition, and in that of all other communities. A mode of
interpretation and a style of expressing that
interpretation- these, though embedded in concrete life,
are nonetheless abstract patterns. What the church also
hands on and remembers is something concrete; namely, a
story which goes beyond but includes a story about the
formation of the community and its subsequent history:
about its triumphs and failures, its heroes and scoundrels,
its joys and sufferings. The focus of the story which the
church hands over and appropriates is on what God and
the church, and ancient Israel as the precursor of the
church, have had to do with each other. In turn, central to
this part of the story is the narrative found in the
Scriptures. It's true that the story of God's dealings with
human beings which the church hands over and
appropriates goes beyond the scriptural narrative-more
elaborately so in Catholicism and Orthodoxy, less
elaborately so in certain versions of Protestantism. But
always the narrative contained in the Scriptures is a central
component of the story handed on by the church.
There are those who argue-1 think they are rightthat it would be a mistake to think it merely coincidental
that the church has a story which it hands on. The people I
have in mind are the proponents of so-called narrative
theology, who argue that the identity of the church is in part
constituted by its handing on a certain story. Thus my Yale
colleague, George Lindbeck, speaks of the church as a
"story-shaped community." In this essay I have set the issues
I wish to discuss within the context of philosophy of art. I
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could just as well have set them within the context of the
birth and flourishing in recent years of narrative theology.
Memorial art lies at the intersection of philosophy of art
and narrative theology-and, as we shall see, of social
theory.
The language I have used in speaking of the three
parts of the church's tradition-interpretation, expression,
and story-might suggest a uniformity and consensus on
these matters which is quite other than the facts. For the
truth is that there are controversies within the community
at all three of these points; and the truth is that different
versions of the interpretation, of the expression, and of the
story, get passed down. To be a member of the church, as
of most other communities in the modern world, is to be a
participant in controversies as to the interpretations,
expressions, and stories which are best for the life of the
community, and most accurate.
In this essay I will be focussing on the concrete story
component in the church's tradition. Without at all
denying the importance in the tradition of a mode of
interpretation and of a mode of expression, it is on the story
in the tradition, on the narrative component, that I will be
focussing. And the question I wish to pursue is this: How
does the church hand on its story of God's dealings with
human beings? How does it keep alive this part of what it
remembers?
In good measure it does so by introducing narrations
of the story into the life of the church. In turn, it does that
in two ways. It invites members of the community to read
the texts which contain the narrative, the central text
being, of course, the Bible. And secondly, on various
occasions it recites components of the narrative, sometimes
within liturgical situations, sometimes outside, sometimes
by using the very words of the received texts, sometimes by
putting the story in its own words.
But there is a third way in which the memories are
kept alive; and this third way will prove, for our purposes,
the most provocative and suggestive. This third way is made
conceptually explicit in the church's celebration of the
Eucharist. In the Eucharist bread and wine are brought
forward; after certain words are spoken the bread is broken
and the wine is poured; then the bread is eaten and the
wine drunk. About all this it is said, at a certain point, that
this is being done as a memorial, or as a remembrance-in
the original Greek, as an anamnesis. Thus a third way in
which the church keeps alive its memory of the story is by
introducing into its life and environment memorials, or
remembrances.
But what is a memorial, a remembrance, an anamnesis?
Well, Jesus is reported in the New Testament as saying to
his disciples at his last meal with them before his execution
that they should keep on doing this as a memorial of him.
Always when the church celebrates the Eucharist it repeats
these words of Jesus; it declares that it is celebrating the
Eucharist in obedience to this command of Jesus. So
perhaps a good place to begin is by asking what Jesus would
have meant, and what his disciples would have understood
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him as meaning, when he said to them that they were to
keep on doing this as a memorial of him.
There can be no doubt that jesus was using a concept
familiar to Israel and employed repeatedly in the Old
Testament, the concept, as it was called in Hebrew, of a
z.ikltaron. Repeatedly in the Old Testament we read that
Israel was to keep alive the memory of its story by doing
something as a z.ikltaron, a memorial, and by introducing
into its environment some object which would function for
it as a z.iltltaron, a memorial. Its way of life and its
environment were to incorporate memorials.
Let us have before us a small selection of examples.
Members of Israel were to keep their fellow Hebrews as
slaves for only six years, setting them free in the seventh
year, so as to remember that God had redeemed them
from slavery in the land of Egypt (Deut. 15:123-15).
Members of Israel were to render justice to the sojourners,
the fatherless, and the widows, so as to remember that God
had redeemed them from slavery in Egypt (Deut.24: 17-18).
Members of Israel were to be content with the first
gleanings of their crops, leaving what remained for the
sojourner, the fatherless, and the widow, so as to remember
that they had been slaves in the land of Egypt (Deut 24:1922). Members of Israel were to keep the seventh day of the
week as a holy sabbath day, so as to remember that God
had brought them out of servanthood in Egypt; on that
day, all Israel was to rest: free adults, children, servants,
sojourners, and even domestic animals (Deut. 5:12 15).
Members of Israel were to observe the passover as a
memorial, so as to remember that they had been slaves in
Egypt; in particular, theyiwere to eat no leavened bread so
as to remember the day when they came out of Egypt
(Deut. 16:1-12; Exodus 12:14-15; 3:3-10).
A striking feature of the Deuteronomic instructions,
to do these various things so as to remember, is that the
purpose stated is not to remember that your forebears were
delivered from Egypt, but to remember that you were
delivered from Egypt. Intervening time is elided. The
elision is even more striking in the instruction concerning
Passover observance found in Exodus (13:8) "And you shall
tell your son on that day, 'it is because of what the Lord did
for me when I came out of Egypt.'" The Haggadah text
which to this day is recited at the Jewish Seder feast
includes the words, "In every generation one ought to
regard oneself as though one has personally come out of
Egypt." I will come back later to this point about the
elision of time.
What is the force of the instruction, Do this in order to
remember, or alternatively, Do this as a memorial? This
question confronts us with a question of procedure. Some
scholars have argued or assumed that the concept of a
memorial (z.ikltaron, anamnesis) is peculiar to the mentality
of the ancient Hebrews, or perhaps more generally, to that
of the ancient Semitic peoples. Central to the attempt by
these scholars to grasp the concept has accordingly been
their looking at the biblical uses of the concept-this then
being one example of the project of biblical word studies
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so popular during the last fifty years or so. Perhaps the best
practitioner of this strategy for the concept of a memorial
has been Max Thurian, the theologian of the monastic
community in Taize, France (cf his The Eucharistic
Memorial) . Thurian's conclusion was that for a people to do
something as a memorial of X is for the community to do it
so as to remind someone of X, in that way bringing it to
that person's attention, and that the context of the biblical
memorials was always the covenant between God and God's
people. It may be to God's attention that the people wish
to bring something; then the context of the memorial
action proper, often expressed in words, will be that of
blessing (thanking, praising) God for God's covenant
fidelity, of which the memorialized event or person was an
indication; and of interceding with God for God's
continued blessing in the future. If, on the contrary, it is the
people themselves that are to be reminded of X, then the
memorial action will be done in the context of a renewed
commitment to obedience, and in the context the
confidence or hope that the memorial action will effect
God's blessing anew. Thurian was inclined to think that
though some biblical memorials were oriented more
toward God, and some, more toward the people, always
there were traces of both orientations. If so, then for the
people to do something as a memorial of X was for them to
do it so as to remind God of X in the context of praising
God for God's covenant fidelity and interceding for its
continuation, and so as to remind themselves of X in the
context of pledging fidelity to the covenant obligations and
expressing hope for the effectuation of God's blessing
anew.
Fascinating and provocative though Thurian 's
discussion is, I do not find its underlying assumption
plausible, that there is a peculiarly Hebraic (or Semitic)
concept of a memorial. It seems to me that Thurian does
succeed in eliciting many of the features peculiar to those
memorials mentioned in the Bible. But from the fact that
the biblical memorials have some peculiar features it
scarcely follows that those features belong to the very
concept of a memorial; it does not follow that something
would not be what they understood as a memorial unless it
showed those features. We must distinguish between the
claim that there is a peculiar biblical or Hebraic concept of
a memorial, and the claim that the general concept of a
memorial is applied in the Hebrew scriptures to memorials
which have somewhat peculiar features.
The linkage of memorials to remembering, and the
fact that there seems little if any difference between the
concept called remembering in (English translations of) the
Bible, and that called remembering in present-day ordinary
English, leads me to think that a memorial, that is, a
z.ikltaron or anamnesis, is just a commemorative object, and
that doing something as a memorial is simply doing it as a
commemoration. I suggest that our modern Western
mentality is not unlike that of the ancient Hebrews in not
having the concept of a memorial; rather, it is like it in
having the concept. For we have the concept of a
Tht Cresstt

commemoration; and this, I suggest, is the very same concept.
All sorts of things are done in commemoration, and
all sorts of things are produced as commemorations: coins
are struck, stamps are issued, fireworks are shot off,
speeches are given, plays are performed, dances are
danced, ·trees are planted, academic conferences are held,
portraits are painted, processions are organized, cenotaphs
are raised, mausoleums are constructed, cities are founded.
Commemorations pervade our way of life and pervade the
environments within which we live our lives. Evidently
something deep about us comes to expression in our
surrounding ourselves with commemorative objects and in
our repetitively engaging in commemorative activities;
evidently something fundamental would be lost if we
ceased to do so.
What is that? Well, we want to be remembering
beings. In fact, however, we often find ourselves to be
forgetful beings. Or if we do not actually forget what we
wish to remember, we find that we fail to keep it clearly in
mind. I suggest that commemorations serve the function of
producing the memory of something in someone, or of
keeping the memory alive or of intensifying the memory,
or of bringing the remembered entity actively before the
mind for a while. Commemorations enhance memory.
Why do we find it important to enhance memory? For
many reasons; and it is worth noting that whereas
remembering itselfworks without a reason-it's just one of
the functions of the mind-commemorations are instituted
and sustained for reasons. Especially prominent among our
reasons for wishing to enhance memory is the desire to
praise or honor: we issue a coin in commemoration of the
emperor so as to honor the emperor. Indeed, I am inclined
to think that if we look closely enough at commemorations
we will always discern some element of honoring-though
that is not always what first catches the eye. It's not just that
the enhancing of memory is of value for our present
existence; somewhere in what we remember there is
something which our commemorating declares to be
worthy of honor. The Orthodox have for generations
commemorated the fall of Constantinople, with the
dominant mood being lament. But in their lament over
the fall of the great city, were they not honoring the city
fallen? Lament, after all, is a mode of honoring. Nations,
so as to keep outrage alive, commemorate the wonds
inflicted on them, that justice may eventually be secured.
But is there not, beneath the outrage, an honoring of those
who fell and of the nation injured? Israel commemorated
its deliverance from slavery; but was it not thereby
honoring its Deliverer? The reason we Americans are
fmding it difficult in this year, 1992, to celebrate the five
hundredth anniversary of the coming of Columbus to these
shores is that a good many of us do not believe that it is an
event worthy of honor.
What is commemorated is never simply
commemorated; is always commemorated as so-and-so.
And for an assembly to commemorate, say, George
Washington as s~and-so, it must believe that he was that.
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Often what the commemorandum is commemorated as, in
a commemorative act, is made explicit in writings,
testimonial speeches, etc., which are comprised within the
commemoration: "We are assembled here to
commemorate George Washington as .... " Other times, it
will remain implicit in the background.
A consequence of the fact that commemoration is
always commemoration-as is that one group may
commemorate a person or event as one thing, and
another, as quite a different thing. There may even be
such discrepancy between these that, though the
commemorandum is the same, the two groups find it
impossible to participate, with integrity, in a common
commemoration. Usually, if not always, in the background
of such disagreements there will be different stories of the
same stretch of history embraced by these different
communities. Members of the French Reformed church
may commemorate the St. Bartholomew's Night Massacre
as the greatest mass martyrdom in the history of their
people; members of the Catholic church may
commemorate it as one of the great victories over heresy.
It is not likely that they will share their commemorations.
Blacks in South Africa may commemorate the Sharpesville
Massacre as the epitome of innocent black suffering;
Afrikaners may commemorate it as one of the glowing
episodes in the attempt to stave off anarchy. They will do
their commemorating separately. The division among
Christians over the Eucharist is a paradigmatic illustration
of the point. Of course it also true that some rituals
performed as commemorations manage to tolerate a wide
diversity of understandings. The ritual gets established as a
social practice and continues ori its way amid profound
disputes over interpretation. Continuity is threatened,
however, when one party succeeds in getting its
interpretation incorporated into words recited within the
commemoration, rather than being content to let its
interpretation remain in the background.
It is worth noting that the use of a certain object or
action to commemorate a particular commemorandum will
typically be grounded in a certain propriety, a certain
"iconic" fittingness. Though one's choice as to what to do
or make so as to commemorate something is always made
from a wide range of options, nonetheless the choice is not
a matter of arbitrary decision. There was an obvious
propriety in Israel's commemorating its release from the
bondage of slavery in Egypt by freeing its slaves every
seventh year. Perhaps there were other things it might have
done which would have been equally appropriate. But
appropriate, this certainly was. Furthermore, rather often the
felt propriety between the mode of commemoration and
the commemorandum takes the form of a re-presentation
of the commemorandum. Whatever else may be the
significance of Fourth of July fireworks, part of it is surely
this: They represent the gunfire of the Revolutionary war.
Commemorations, so I have been suggesting, have
the function of enhancing social memory. But of course
the study of history also does so. Part of what differentiates
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commemorations from history teaching and study is just
this underlying iconic fittingness between mode of
commemoration and commemorandum to which I have
been calling attention. Schooling in history often leaves
obscure what the community thinks worth honoring from
its past; that is one way in which it differs from
commemorations. But more important, it is considerations
of pedagogical effectiveness which underly a community's
decisions as to how to teach history to its young, rather
than considerations of iconic fittingness. Or rather, insofar
as considerations of iconic fittingness enter into the
teaching of history, such teaching acquires a
commemorative dimension.
The things that we in the modern world
commemorate are mostly items, episodes and persons
from history; but this is not necessarily so. The thing
remembered may have its place in some story of the
community without the story being true; the story may be
myth. Or the main outlines of the story may be true
without the particular event commemorated ever having
happened, or the particular thing ever having existed.
Thus it is that 'primitive' peoples commemorated elements
from their mythology; and thus it is that modern nations
often commemorate highly embroidered versions of
historical episodes. Indeed, accurate history is often
destructive of commemoration; the desire to keep the
commemoration going often requires co-opting or exiling
the historians. Many of the commemorations of the
Afrikaners would not survive the widespread acceptance of
Leonard Thompson's demythologizing of Afrikaner
history.
<>
Lastly, commemoration is radically different from
simply keeping in mind, radically different from simply
recalling. Commemorating requires doing things with
one's body or making things with one's hands.
Commemoration is embodiment, incarnation. And when
we find that others want to commemorate the same thing
we do, and commemorate it as the same thing we want to
commemorate it as, then we join in a solidarity of
commemorating. Such shared commemorating typically
then loops back to intensify the solidarity and expand its
scope. Commemorating expresses community; and in so
doing, it intensifies and expands community.
Commemorating helps to protect, against the acids of
forgetfulness, what is worthy of honor and praise, lament
and outrage. As we contemplate our future with each
other, we see change and fickleness; to compensate, we
covenant With each other. Covenants introduce a stability
into the future which otherwise would not be there. So, in
a similar way, commemorations introduce stability into
what we carry forward from the past. Though what is
commemorated recedes ever farther into the past, our
commemorations keep its honored memory alive in the
present. Covenants, looking ahead, introduce stability into
a sea of fickleness; commemorations, looking back,
introduce endurance into a sea of forgetfulness.
Given the importance, in the Jewish and Christian
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commumties, of remembering the acts of God in history,
and remembering the prophets, teachers and saints by way
of whom God specially acted, one can expect that
commemorative actions and objects will occupy an
important place in the lives of these communities. And so
they do, except when remembering the story falls away in
favor of immediately experiential, or abstractly theological
or ethical, approaches to God. Once one begins to reflect
on it, one sees that Christian lives are filled with
commemorations of events and persons from the biblical
story and from the story of the church. The Christian week,
for example, with its 1+6 structure, is a commemoration
adapted from the Jewish week with its 6+1 structure. And
very much in the Christian liturgy is done in
commemoration; as are very many of the objects in the
liturgical environment, commemorative objects. The New
Testament itself, as we saw, says that the followers of Jesus
are to commemorate him by eating a meal, the meal itself
being a re-presentation of his last meal before his
crucifixion.
Thus far I have taken all my concrete examples from
the life of the Christian community. To show that the
points made have much wider application, let me give here
a description (from Paul Connerton) of some of the
commemorations instituted by the Nazis in the 1930s as a
means of social remembering:
The liturgical year began on 30 January with the anniversary of
Hitler's seizure of power in 1933. On that day each year Hitler's speech tc
the ReichstaK> transmitted by radio, presented 'the nation' with an account
of what he had done with the power entrusted to him; the torchlight
procession of 30 January 1933 was annuaUy repeated... .Every year on 24
February a ceremony exclusively for the 'old guard' commemorated the
foundation of the Party, the 'annunciation' of the 'immutable' programme
of twenty-five points in the Hofbrauhaus in 1920. 16 March was a
national day of mourning, taken over from the Weimar Republic and
dedicated to the memory of the dead of the Great War. On the last Sunday
of every March fourteen-year-olds joined the Hitler Youth in a rite of
passage whose focal point, in precise anawgy with the confession of belief
in Christ at confirmation, was the swearing of allegiance to the Fuhrer.
The Fuhrer's birthday on 20 April was celebrated with a parade of the
Wehrmacht through the Brandenburg Gate. The national festival of the
German people, held on 1 May, and originating as a workers- festiva~
was stripped of its internationalist overtones and reinterpreted as a
celebration of German Volksgemeinschaft ... .No festival was infused
with more potent cultic force than that which commemorated the Putsch,
the 'bkJod baptism • of 1923. Its theme was the sacrifice, the struggle, and
the eventual victory of the 'old fighters' of National Socialism. The
survivors of the Putsch, decorated with their 'BILJod Order•, met for the
traditional gathering in the Munich Burgerbraukeller on 8 November,
there to listen to Hitler's memorial address dedicated to 'the sixteen martyrs
of the national Socialist movement'. On the folwwing day the "old
fighters" marched from the Burgtrbraukeller to the FeldhernhaUe, ritually
repeating the march awng a route marked by burning torches, to the
accompaniment of funereal music, the tolling of bells, and the slow recital
of the names of all those killed since 1919 in the service of the Party.
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Seldom if ever has there been a movement as gifted as the
Nazi's at devising commemorations to enhance social
memory. Every nation, however, provides analogues. And
what is especially clear in the Nazi commemorations is an
important feature of commemorations which I have space
only to mention, not discuss: Commemorations are
instruments of social power. Those who control the
commemorations shape the community.
II

My suggestion, now, is that a great deal of the visual
art produced by the Christian community is to be
understood as memorial art. It functions as a memorial, or
commemoration, of persons, objects, and episodes in the
story of the community.
Over the last fifty years or so a good many writers,
especially in the Anglican tradition, have felt an affinity
between art, on the one hand, and the Eucharist, on the
other. David Jones and Dorothy Sayers are good examples.
The concept they have used so as to explicate this felt
affmity has been that of sacrament. Taking for granted that
the Eucharist is a sacrament, they have tried to show that
art, or some art, is also a sacrament. In order to .get the
concept of sacrament to fit art in general, they have had to
truncate the concept of sacrament, with the consequence
that, though art may now be a sacrament, in this strippeddown sense of "sacrament," the word can now not be used
in this sense to express what Christians have wanted to say
when they called the Eucharist a sacrament. It no longer
has the meaning which Augustine had in mind when he
defined sacrament as something which effects the divine
grace which it signifies. But the Eucharist is ·not only a
sacrament; it is also a memorial plus much more besides.
And my suggestion is that very many of the works of art
produced by the church are memorials in the very same
sense that the Eucharist is a memorial. The concept of
memorial, rather than the concept of sacrament, is the
link.
Consider once again the example with which we
began, Pieter Brueghel the Elder's painting, The Census at
Bethlehem. Can there be any doubt that Brueghel, by
creating this painting, produced a commemoration of the
episode, recorded in the Gospel of Luke, of Mary and
Joseph going to Bethlehem to have their names recorded
in the census ordered by the Roman emperor? Can there
be any doubt that this painting functioned in Brueghel's
community as a means of social memory? Of course there
are other dimensions and functions of this painting worth
noting and reflecting on. One can take note of its aesthetic
qualities. One can take note of the ideas and feelings to
which Brueghel gave expression. One can try to puzzle out
the symbolism in the picture: Is the contrast between
ruined buildings and buildings under construction a
symbol of the contrast between paganism and Christianity?
In suggesting that we think of this painting as a memorial, I
am not proposing that we displace these other approaches; I
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am proposing that we supplement them.
My reference to symbols in Brueghel's painting
suggests that visual art can function as a memorial of
episodes, persons, and objects in the Christian story
without being representational art; it may be symbolic art,
or a blend of the two. Crosses are memorials of the cross
of Christ; typically they are more symbolic than
representational. The lamb in the altarpiece of Jan van
Eyck in the church of St. Bavo in Ghent is a memorial of
Christ; but it too is more symbol than representation of
Christ. And the rooster atop the Reformed churches
throughout Europe is a memorial symbol of the coming of
light-that is, of salvation-into the world with the
resurrection of Jesus Christ. Let me add that not all
symbols, not even all 'Christian' symbols, function as
memorials, as commemorations; some do, some do not.
They do so only if they symbolize some concrete event or
person or object from story or history. Many symbols
denote abstract entities; circles, for example, are often
symbols of eternity. As such, they are not memorial symbols.
Theorists will ask how to understand the contrast I
am using here between symbols and representations. I do not
propose giving a full account here. But one aspect of the
difference has to do with the fact that visual depictions
differ from each other with respect to how many of their
features are significant for determining what is depicted
and what it is depicted as. The difference between symbol
and representation has to do, in part, with placement on
this continuum. A visual depiction is more a symbol, the
fewer of its features are thus significant; it is more a
representation, the more of its features are thus significant.
Most crosses hanging in churches are, by this
criterion, very much in the direction of being symbols
rather than representations of the cross of Christ. The
color, the texture, the size, the material-seldom are
these to be interpreted as determining some specific kind
of cross on which Jesus was crucified. By contrast, most of
the lines and colors in Brueghel's painting function to
determine the specific world which he projected; most
discernible differences of paint on canvas would have
meant differences in the world projected. The roosters
atop Reformed churches are an interesting blend of
symbol and representation, this on different levels. What
are found atop the churches are, of course, not flesh-andblood roosters but three-dimensional representations of
roosters; differences in the sculptures do very much
determine differences in the sorts of roosters depicted. But
differences among the sculptures, and thereby among the
roosters depicted, do not determine differences in what is
symbolized. These rooster sculptures all just symbolize the
resurrection ofJesus.
III
I close by calling attention to what seems to me a
fascinating feature of many of the representations which
function as commemorations of events, persons, and
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objects in the Christian story. Let me approach the point I
wish to make by noting that the more an artist's depiction
of something in the Christian story is a representation
rather than a symbol, the more likely it is that the visual
artist, with his or her imagination, will have to "flesh out"
what is given in the received narratives. When narrating the
story of Joseph and Mary going to Bethlehem for the
census, Luke does not mention the color of Mary's robe,
nor whether Mary came riding on a donkey, nor whether
Joseph's hair was graying, etc. Yet Brueghel, by way of his
painting, has projected for us a world in which these
matters are determined along with a host of others which
in Luke's narration are undetermined. Visual memorials of
items and episodes in the Christian story, in so far as they
are representations, invariably project for us a much richer
and more detailed world-fragment than do the verbal
narrations of those same items or episodes.
One issue which the visual artist, unlike the verbal
narrator, typically confronts when he or she proposes to
compose a representation of some episode in the biblical
story, is this: What setting is to be given to this episode? Of
course the picture can be composed in such a way that the
setting is pretty much obscured; that is true of a great many
of the icons from the world of Eastern Orthodoxy. But
artists, if they have not followed that strategy, have almost
invariably chosen one or the other of two strategies: They
have placed the episode in a setting typical of the time and
place at which the episode occurred, as they imagine that
to have been; or they have placed the episode in a setting
typical of the time and place of the artist Rembrandt, to
the best of my knowledge, always adopted the former
strategy: Christ and his con temporaries are dressed and
housed in what a seventeenth century Dutchman supposed
to be the garb and architecture of Palestine in the first
century. Brueghel, in The Census at &thlehem, chose the
latter strategy. He set the census at Bethlehem in a
contemporary village of Brabant Brueghel's Bethlehem is
a village in Brabant.
The Rembrandt strategy is an invitation for us to
imagine those things happening then and there, when and
where they did. The Brueghel strategy is an invitation for
us to imagine those things happening here and now. This
much seems obvious and straightforward. But what is the
significance of each of these two different strategies? What
would lead one to choose one over the other?
The Rembrandt strategy feels the more natural to me.
Once the glaze of familiarity has been cracked, I am
startled by the Brueghel strategy, arrested, led to ask: Why
would he do it like that? Why would he show Mary and
Joseph coming into a sixteenth century Brabantine village
for the census called by Caesar Augustus? About the
Rembrandt strategy I am not led to ask why he did it like
that. Now and then one comes across Mary depicted as a
young American female teenager. I find this startling; I'm
sure it is meant to startle.
I think I react this way because I share in the so-called
"historical consciousness." I do my thinking in terms of a
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long sweep of human history; and I think of the episodes of
the biblical story as occupying just one segment of that
sweep, a segment which ended roughly 1900 years ago.
Between me and that segment there is a long historical
gap; I am not the contemporary of the episodes which
occur in that segment. When one thinks in this way, the
Rembrandt strategy seems obviously appropriate. Of course
I regard those episodes as remaining profoundly relevant
to me; thus I wish to remember them. I welcome the
memorials and narrations which enhance remembering.
Yet the events which I remember are long past.
The Brueghel strategy deletes the temporal gap
between the artist and the biblical episodes memorialized.
The artist and the episodes become contemporaries. The
original viewers of Brueghel's painting were invited to
imagine Mary and Joseph coming riding into their village
late one afternoon. Admittedly we who are immersed in
the historical consciousness sometimes try to do something
not entirely unlike such imagining. We try to imagine what
it would have been like to live in the situation whose history
we are writing or researching or reading; some of our great
historians are masters at enabling us to do this. Instead of
imagining Mary riding into one's village late this afternoon
for the census which is going on, one imagines what it was
like when, late one afternoon, Mary came riding with her
husband Joseph into ancient Bethlehem for the imperial
census of c. 4 B.C.E.
Once again, what is the significance of the Brueghel
strategy, as compared to the Rembrandt? I don't think I
fully know. But before I nonetheless make some tentative
suggestions, it is relevant, and it may be helpful, to note
that the deletion of the gap also occurs in some of the
hymns of the church concerning episodes from the
Christian story. I suspect that the deletion as it occurs here
is, for all of us, less startling than it is in the case of
Brueghel's painting. Possibly that it because it is less clear
whether we are to imagine those events then and there, or
to imagine those actors here and now-though my own
sense is that the latter is almost always suggested more
strongly than the former. (An exception: "Were You There
when They Crucified My Lord?")
Here are some examples. We all know the first verse
of Charles Wesley's hymn, "Hark, the Herald Angels Sing"
Hark, the herald angels sing,
"Glory to the new-born king.
Peace on earth and mercy mild,
God and sinners reconciled."
Joyful all ye nations rise,
Join the triumph of the skies,
with the angelic host proclaim,
"Christ is born in Bethlehem."
Hark, the herald angels sing,
"Glory to the new-born King!"
And here is a translation of the first verse of a Christma&
hymn by Paul Gerhardt:
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All my heart this night rejoices
as I hear, far and near,
sweetest angel voices:
"Christ is born," their choirs are singing,
till the air everywhere
now with joy is ringing.
The first verse of another hymn by Charles Wesley, this one
an Easter hymn, goes like this:
"Christ the Lord is risen today," Alleluia!
Sons of men and angels say: Alleluia!
Raise your joys and triumphs high; Alleluia!
Sing, ye heavens, and earth reply. Alleluia!
One imagines that when Wesley composed those lines, the
old Latin carol, Surrexit Christus Hodie, was ringing in his
ears. Its first verse, in English translation, goes like this:
Jesus Christ is risen today, Alleluia!
Our triumphant holy day, Alleluia!
Who did once, upon the cross, Alleluia!
Suffer to redeem our loss. Alleluia!
It may be noted that it is characteristic of hymns in this
liturgical present tense, as one might call it, to insert such
indexicals as "now," " today," "this night," "this day," " this
happy morn," etc., as if to make doubly sure we do not miss
the point.
But what is the point? Well, no doubt part of the
effect-whether or not the point-part of the effect is to
give what happened then an immediacy for us. Rembrandt
believed that the events of the biblical story remained
profoundly relevant to him in the seventeenth century; that
of course is why his memorial representations of them are
so important a part of his oeuvre. But the Brueghel strategy
does not so much give one the feeling that those events
remain relevant to us as the feeling that they are happening
among us. A deconstructionist of the Derridean sort would
see it as one more example of the vain attempt to secure
presence.
It is as if a different understanding of history is at
work. Perhaps the understanding at work is the one
described in the opening chapters of Erich Auerbach's
Mimesis and in Hans Frei's The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative. It
goes something like this: The story narrated in the biblical
text is the fundamental historical reality, not merely one
segment of a long sweep of historical reality of which no
one segment is any more fundamental than any other. To
understand the rest of history, we must relate it to that
fundamental history by some such strategy as type and antitype. A collapsing building in one's sixteenth century
Brabantine village typifies paganism; the new building
being erected in one's village typifies Christianity. A
woman riding into one's village one day on a donkey led
by her aged husband typifies Mary and Joseph coming to
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Bethlehem; a census in one's village typifies the census
ordered by the Roman emperor. Let me give you some of
Auerbach's own words:
Far from seeking, like Homer, merely to make us forget
our own reality for a few hours, [the biblical narrative]
seeks to overcome our reality: we are to fit our own life
into its world, feel ourselves to be elements in its
structure of universal history .... Everything else that
happens in the world can only be conceived as an
element in this sequence; into it everything that is
known about the world ... must be fitted as an ingredient
of the divine plan ... (15-16).
It all seems very strange to us. We think of words as
signifying things; we don't think of things as signifying
things. But if this was indeed how Brueghel and his
contemporaries were thinking, the use of the Brueghel
strategy for representing episodes from the biblical story
would not have struck them as surprising. When the
typological sense of scripture was alive and well, then the
Brueghel strategy would have seemed appropriate. For us,
the Rembrandt strategy is the natural one. So perhaps what
occurred between Brueghel and Rembrandt, to account for
the difference of sensibilities, was the birth of the
'!historical consciousness" and the death of the belief that
reality is a text to be interpreted by observing how the
persons, things, and events around us signify the persons,
things, and events of salvation history.
I have cited, as a startling contemporary example of
the Brueghel strategy, the paintings which one sees now
and then of Mary as an American female teenager. Vastly
more interesting contemporary examples of the strategy,
however, are the paintings which emerged from the base
communities on the island of Solentiname in Nicaragua. It
was typical of the Bible discussions in the base communities
for the leaders first to read and explain some biblical story,
and then to invite the participants to reflect on the
significance of the story for their lives there and then. The
paintings seem obviously a reflection of that practice.
Traditionally, what a passage of scripture meant for the
lives of its readers was called its 'tropological sense." The
pattern which begins to emerge from our reflections is that
when the literal sense of a biblical story is prominent, then
the Rembrandt strategy will seem appropriate; whereas
when either the typological or the tropological sense is
prominent in consciousness, then the Brueghel strategy
will seem appropriate.
If this is right, then what was said just a bit earlier can
now be described somewhat more accurately. I suggested
that it was the rise of the historical consciousness, and the
decline of the typological consciousness, which led to the
increasing use of the Rembrandt strategy and the declining
use of the Brueghel strategy. The more accurate way to
describe the phenomenon would be this: The rise or the
historical consciousness was associated with an increasing
emphasis on the literal sense of the biblical narratives, and
with a decreasing emphasis on their typological sense-and
this led, correspondingly, to a shift from the Brueghel
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strategy to the Rembrandt strategy. It turns out, however,
that the historical consciousness is compatible with the
existence of communities in which there is intense
emphasis on the tropological sense of biblical narrative;
and when that is the case, the Brueghel strategy will once
again tend to come to the fore.
What must now be noted, in turn, is that there are
other dynamics than the rise of the historical consciousness
which can lead to emphasis on the literal sense-and
hence, if I am right in my tracing of the connections here,
to the use of the Rembrandt strategy. What I especially
have in mind is the pattern of Ignatian spirituality. In The
Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius we read, in the"first
exercise" of the first week, that •The first prelude is a mental
image of the place." To this it is added, in explanation,
that "when the meditation or contemplation is on a visible
object, for example, contemplating Christ our Lord during
His life on earth, the image will consist of seeing with the
mind's eye the physical place where the object that we wish
to contemplate is present." Then in the "first
contemplation" of the first day of the second week we read
that •The first prelude is to recall to mind the history of the
subject I am about to contemplate," and that •The second
prelude is a mental representation of the place ... .! will then
see particularly the city of Nazareth in the province of
Galilee, and the house a~d room where our Lady dwells."
The directions for the '"second contemplation" of the first
day of the second week are even more explicit in the
pattern of imagining which they prescribe:
The first prelude is to review the history of the
Nativity. How our Lady, almost nine months with child,
set out from Nazareth, seated on an ass, as may piously
be believed, together with Joseph and a servant girl
leading an ox. They are going to Bethlehem to pay the
tribute that Caesar has imposed on the whole land.
The second prelude is to form a men tal image of the
scene and see in my imagination the road from
Nazareth to Bethlehem. I will consider its length and
breadth, and whether it is level or winding through
valleys and over hills. I will also behold the place of the
cave of the Nativity, whether it is large or small, whether
high or low, and what it contains ....
The first point is to see the persons: our Lady and St.
Joseph, the servant girl, and the Child Jesus after his
birth. I will become a poor, miserable, and unworthy
slave looking upon them, contemplating them, and
ministering to their needs, as though I were present
there. I will then reflect within myself in order that I
may derive some fruit.
The second point is to observe, consider, and
contemplate what they are saying and to reflect within
myself that I may derive some profit.
The third point is to observe and consider what they
are doing: the journey and suffering which they
undergo in order that our Lord might be born in
extreme poverty, and after so many labors; after hunger
and thirst, heat and cold, insults and injuries, He might
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die on the cross, and all this for me. I will then reflect in
order to gain some spiritual profit.
From these passages it is clear that Ignatian spirituality
places heavy emphasis on the literal sense of the biblical
narratives; it is equally clear that the appropriate
representational strategy will be what I have called "the
Rembrandt strategy." Indeed, not only is one to imagine
Mary and Joseph coming into Bethlehem; one is to
imagine oneself there in Bethlehem, watching them. "As
though I were present there," says Ignatius. This, then, is
the full converse of the Brueghelian direction of
imagining: Instead of imagining Mary and Joseph here with
me now, I am to imagine myself there with them then.
Once again the gap between me and them is closed--only
now in the opposite direction. The conclusion must be that
the contrast between the Brueghel strategy and the
Rembrandt strategy reflects not just different
understandings of history but different types of spirituality.
For notice that the point of the imagining, for Ignatius, is
"to gain some spiritual profit."
Let me return, from these speculations, to my main
point. Communities live by memory and by hope. Both are
in constant danger of decaying. So communities try to keep
both alive. I have focussed on how communities try to keep
memory alive, especially, memories of their stories; they do
so, I have suggested, by publishing and reading narratives,
by performing and listening to recitals, and by the
introduction of memorials into their lives. My suggestion is
that a great deal of visual art functions as memorial art; it
serves to commemorate persons, objects, and events. Art
serves to keep alive the memory of the stories by which
communities live.
Sometimes those stories are life-giving; sometimes
they are destructive and life diminishing-destructive of
people outside the community, diminishing of the lives of
some of those within the community. Art serving both life
and death. Our globe has today become the home of a vast
pluralistic society, filled with tensions among nations,
among religions, among races, among genders. In both the
perpetuation of these tensions, and the healing of these
tensions, our stories are among the principal actors; and
our stories, in turn, are kept alive by our art. King Billy at
the battle of the Boyne : all across Belfast one sees the
paintings, larger than life-size, slapped onto the sides of
buildings. Can there be peace in Northern Ireland? 0
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In this essay I will try to provoke reflection upon the
relationship between Christianity and con temporary
conceptions of the academic vocation by addressing two
related matters. First, I will briefly sketch some of the
cultural impulses that served as a context for the
development of an understanding of the academic
vocation that attained hegemony in this country after
World War II. A proper understanding of these cultural
developments will lead us, I think, to construe them as
something of a modernist heresy and so to add a measure
of urgency to the task of Christian reflection upon the
purposes and the character of academic life. Second, I
shall seek to correct for this heresy by considering and
interpreting one of the great stories from the Bible, a story
about knowledge, its sources, its uses, and its limitations. I
shall thereby invite us to comprehend academic life and
the academic vocation through a dialogue between our
present situation as academics and one of the formative
narratives of our tradition.
Mark Schwehn is Dean of Christ Coll~ge, the Honors College of
Valparaiso University. This lecture was delivered as a conference
paper for the Lilly conference "The Integration of Faith and
Learning" at Baylor University in April, 1992. Portions of this
essay will appear as part of a forthcoming book, Exiles from
Eden: Religion and the Academic Vocation in America, to
be published lYy Oxford University Press in November of 1992.
Professor Schwehn writes freqr.umtly for The Cresset, and portions
of his book were originally published in these pages, notably the
articles "Academics as a Vocation, " in the April and May issues of
1985.
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Hannah Arendt isolated, ·in The Human Condition,
what is arguably the most import1mt signal element in that
congeries of intellectual impulses that has come to be
known as modernism. She analyzed what she called the
ascendancy of homo faber over homo sapiens, the triumph of
the human being understood as the one who makes or
creates or fabricates over the human being understood as
the one who seeks or possesses wisdom. (153-59; 294-96)
Let me sketch four manifestations of this cultural tendency
that has so deeply marked the twentieth century: Max
Weber's conception of the vocation of scholarship,
modernist writers' conception of the human being as artist,
William Perry's description of students as makers of
meaning, and Clifford Geertz's understanding of the
human being and the academic being.
In his famous 1918 address, "Wissenschaft als Beruf,"
Max Weber based his conception of the vocation of
scholarship upon religious views of life even as he at the
same time insisted that we must and do live in a world
without God. Like much of Nietzsche's work, Weber's
analysis of academic life demonstrated the impossibly
exacting, even absurd, psychological consequences of
attempting to live out a Christian ethic absent any belief in
Jesus the Christ. But whereas Nietzsche proceeded from
this demonstration to urge us to abandon the Christian
ethos altogether, Weber urged us to retain the Protestant
ethic while at the same time abandoning the system of
Christian belief that made such an ethic bearable. Indeed,
Weber's account of the academic vocation can seem, for
these reasons, alternatively ennobling and devastating.

29

Consider first of all Weber's pronouncement that all
valuable academic work is highly specialized work. In The
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Weber had
argued that, for all Protestants, vocations were ordained by
God for the purposes of ordering the world and serving
humanity on earth. Division of labor was part of God's
providence, and so Christians could find meaning in their
vocations precisely because they could trust that God would
orchestrate their separate and specialized endeavors into a
kind of divine economy directed toward serving neighbors
(Luther) or (as the Puritan would have it) the common
good (Protestant Ethic, 160-61). Thus, the Puritan
Berufsmensch "neither inquires about nor finds it necessary
to inquire about the meaning of his actual practice of a
vocation within the whole world, the total framework of
which is not his responsibility, but his God's" (Economy and
Society, 548). In sum, the source of all callings was God and
their collective end was human flourishing.

By contrast, the powers that bear down upon modem
humans and that ordain their callings are, according to
Weber, not divine; rather, they are the inexorable
conditions of modernity itself-specialization,
rationalization, and intellectualization. The specialized
nature of the academic ,calling is then given, not by God,
but by the "fate of our times." To what human good or
goods is specialized academic work directed? Simply to the
end of Wusenschaft - making knowledge. The specialized
products of academic work are not, however, part of a
larger whole in terms of which they can be said to have
meaning and significance. Nor can their value be
understood in terms of some substantive goal beyond
themselves like human well being or the public good.
Whereas the larger implication of their work had been left
by the Puritans to God, "in the modern setting, it is simply
left. .. " (Eisen, 214).
Weber's scholars had to renounce more than
substantive goods that would give purpose to their
scholarship. They had also to renounce, in their callings,
spontaneous enjoyment, emotional satisfaction, and
communal affections. And again, scholars had to subject
themselves to this ascetic regimen without the religious
consolations, assurances, duties, and commitments that
might have made sense of such self-abnegating behavior.
"The Puritan," Weber wrote, "like every rational type of
asceticism, tried to enable a man to maintain and act upon
his constant motives, especially those which it taught him
itself, against the emotions. . . . Contrary to many popular
ideas, the end of this asceticism was to be able to lead an
alert, intelligent life: the most urgent task the destruction
of spontaneous, impulsive enjoyment, the most important
means was to bring order into the conduct of its adherents"
(Protestant Ethic, 119). The constant motives of academics
were, for Weber, supplied by the inner logic of the
academic disciplines themselves, and the true scholar acted
from a sense of duty to these disciplines, never from
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purposes external to them, much less from inclination or
the pursuit of pleasure.
The price of mastery of a discipline, for the Weberian
scholar, was resigned acceptance, even advancement, of
the retreat of "the ultimate and most sublime values" from
scholarly life. Whereas Protestants had made the whole
world and their own callings within it a sacred realm of
God's providential care, Weberian academics systematically
advanced the process of secularization. Weber proclaimed
to his dying day that "the intrusion of normative statements
into scholarly questions is the work of the Devil" (quoted
by Levine, 192).
Finally, the academic calling was, for Weber, a
peculiarly anxious and lonely business. He had noted in
The Protestant Ethic that the English Puritans' emphasis
upon an "exclusive trust in God" had led them to issue
"warnings against any trust in the aid of friendship of men"
(106). And he had insisted that, in spite of the crucial
importance of church membership for the Calvinist, "his
intercourse with his God was carried on in deep spiritual
isolation." Indeed, Calvinism tended, according to Weber,
"to tear the individual away from the closed ties with which
he is bound to this world" (Ethic, 106-7). These accents
carried over into Weber's own understanding of the
modern vocation of scholarship as an impersonal and
solitary undertaking. He invariably referred, when he
spoke of the scholarly community, not to specific webs of
human beings working in close personal relationship to
one another, but to highly abstract entities such as fields of
study, scientific disciplines, and forms of rationality.
Again, Weber's academic was even more acutely
lonely than his Puritan precursor. However profound were
the depths of the Puritan's spiritual isolation, he at least
had a relationship with God. But the Weberian academic
could merely wait alone, in disciplined attention, for the
chance infusion of mundane grace that would lead him to
a temporary salvation through his making a correct
conjecture in his manuscript. We can, said Weber, in
principle master all things by calculation. But, as we have
seen, by stripping the idea of a calling of its religious
dimension, Weber associated academic life with loneliness,
mastery, and alienation. Scholarship is just making
knowledge, and there are no limits to it, but it is a lonely
and alienating business.
So much for Weber. Consider now two giants of
modernity, Henry Adams and James Joyce, both of whom
were contemporaries of Weber. Henry Adams modelled
his Education of Henry Adams on the great spiritual
autobiography of St. Augustine. And he was careful and
astute enough to observe that whereas Augustine in the
Confessions had worked from multiplicity to unity, he had
been forced to reverse this movement and to work from
unity to multiplicity. He moreover stated precisely, in
terms that were very similar to Weber's, those conditions
of the modem West that made his journey through life so
different from Augustine's: technological change, the
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increased velocity of history, the rise of modern science,
centralization and concentration of political power, and
the "stupendous failure of Christianity." Adams's journey
took the form of a quest for some grand generalization that
would "fmish his clamor to be educated." After failing to
find a "final solution," he concluded that he had to invent
a "formula of his own," that he had to make meaning
rather than find it. He thus became the prototypical
twentieth-century academic hero. By inverting the story of
Genesis through a play upon his own name, Adams, he
created or at least helped to create the myth of the manmade self.
So too with James Joyce in A Portrait of the Arlist as a
Young Man. Repudiating his Jesuit education, the young
Stephen Dedalus, the magnificent artificer, adopts as a
motto the defiant words of Lucifer, non seroiam, I will not
serve. Instead of service, he chooses to create. As with
Adams, intelligence is used to fabricate, not to serve. The
modernists, academic and non-academic alike, had no
sooner announced that God was dead than they had to
replace the deity with the allegedly limitless scope of their
own creative powers.
The residues of this cultural transformation are
everywhere abundant, not least of all in the prevailing
ethos of the modern academy. Thus, when William Perry
writes, in his widely studied articles about stages of
cognitive and ethical development in American college
students, he does so in terms of the making of meaning, not
as he might have, in terms of sanctification or a movemer.t
toward the truth of matters, or a succession of syntheses.
Thus too, when Clifford Geertz writes about the career
patterns peculiar to the academy, he remarks that
academics, unlike all other professionals, "begin at the
center of things and then move out or down to the
margins." He continues as follows: "studying English at
Princeton and then teaching it at LSU can lend a peculiar
tone to your life. It is the exiles-from-Eden syndrome"
(Geertz, 158-59). Princeton, on this reckoning is Eden.
You can imagine my confusion, given this imagery, in
moving from the University of Chicago to Valparaiso
(which means, implausibly enough given Northern
Indiana's notoriously severe winters, "vale of Paradise") .
We have seen that Weber defined the modern
academic vocation by transmuting a religious vocabulary
drawn from the Reformed tradition. In a manner and
with a purpose very much like Weber's, Henry Adams and
James Joyce appropriated and sometimes subverted the
vocabulary of the great biblical creation narratives in order
to develop distinctively modern ideas of spiritual
formation. Thus, if we undertake to provide some
corrective to the ascendancy of homo faber in these
modernist accounts, we must reach behind Adams and
Joyce to their sources in Genesis.
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In Genesis 1:27 we are told that male and female
were created in the image of God. Volumes have been
written over the centuries in an effort to explain the
meaning of the imago dei. Whatever the full implications of
the idea might be, one interpretation seems clear from the
text and from the most persistent of the traditions of
reading it. Human beings were meant to share in the
creative powers of their Maker. We therefore cannot
discount altogether the modernist emphasis upon homo
faber, and we surely want to preserve what is both truthful
and important in the notion that humankind participates
most fully in the divine in the act of creation. On the other
hand, the first creation story makes it quite clear that the
Creator, not the human creatures, brings form to matter,
animation to dust, order to chaos. The Orderer and the
activity of ordering precede humanity.
The second creation narrative provides the basic
materials from which the various modernist myths have
been fashioned and refashioned. The earth creature, the
ha 'adam, of this second creation story belongs to all of us in
the contemporary West, whether or not we are religious.
We will therefore all experience, as we retrieve some of the
insights in the story of the first Adam, something of a shock
of re-cognition. Precisely because so many of the emphases
in the story have been strangely inverted over the course of
the last century, the authority, the power, and the truth of
the original story seem now, ironically enough, all the
more compelling. Its authority derives, for the religious
and the non-religious alike, not from ecclesiastical
imprimaturs, still less from divine decree, but from the
immanent powers of the text to disclose to us our own
condition. As we grow more deeply aware of the
predicaments of our century, the original story seems to set
before us the truth about ourselves more thoroughly and
persuasively than any of its modernist variants.
If we read this second creation narrative as a
philosophical exploration of the human condition
expressed in narrative form, we will find that it speaks
directly to at least three of the central matters that pertain
to Christianity and the academic vocation. I shall
accordingly address each of these three inter-related issues
in turn: the quest for community, the perilous pursuit of
knowledge as power, and the point of Christian higher
education in a dis--ordered world.

The Quest for Community
Immediately after the Lord God has spoken for the
first time to the earth creature, the human taken from the
ground, the Creator concludes that it is not good that this
creature should be alone in the world. The first speaking
in this story creates or at least makes manifest the
condition of creatureliness: God commands, the human
listens; God permits and prohibits, setting limits for the
human. In other words, Creator and creature are not
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equal, not perhaps fitting companions. Whatever the case
here, human loneliness arises as a problem immediately
after the creature becomes aware that it is a creature, that
it is in a very direct and explicit sense limited.
The Lord God instantly discerns this difficulty and
moves to remedy it, soon enlisting the counsel and aid of
the earth creature in the process. The Lord God creates
the animals, bringing them before the earth creature "to
see what he would name them." Thus, language, the power
to name and classifY, judgment, the capacity to determine
what is fit for companionship and what is not, and cocreation, the authority to dispose of what the Lord God
proposes, arise in quest of community. The new human
vocabulary of classification does not create being where
there was none before; rather, it determines relationship in
the course of conferring identity. Inventing a vocal index
here is most definitely not a desperate gesture of originality. And indeed, human beings still name and classifY
animals, including especially the fossilized remains of early
hominids, with reference to themselves and to the
relationships that are thought to obtain between any given
animal species and the genus homo.
Alas, after all of the animals are formed (like the
human "out of the ground"), "there was not found a helper
fit" for human companionship. Radical surgery seems
required. And so the Creator creates once more, not one
but two new beings-the human male and the human
female. Out of one, the earth creature, come two, man
and woman. (Trible, 80) Community is finally
accomplished through an act of acknowledgement: "This at
last is bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh." The last
word of Genesis 2 is a later interpolation that seeks to
construe both physical intimacy and generation as signs of
this acknowledgement over time. 'Therefore a man leaves
his father and mother and cleaves to his wife, and they
become one flesh."
Though some of these readings have occasioned
considerable controversy, three points, at least, seem
indisputable from a reading of Genesis 2. First, the
human exercises discriminating judgment in order to
establish and secure relationships. Second, this endeavor
takes place within a context of harmony between the
human and the divine, the vegetable world and the animal
world. Third, the male and the female are indeed "variants
upon a single ground plan," grounded, if you will, in a
common humanity itself formed "from the ground" by a
creator God who seeks to remedy human loneliness
through the creation of gender and companionship. The
principal source of attraction between the sexes is
loneliness, not erotic desire. Finally, knowledge and
acknowledgement are linked to intimacy and community,
not to alienation and estrangement. The exercise of
discernment arises here in quest of community and later in
the very act of procreation. Human beings as here
portrayed are more pro-creators than co-creators.
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Knowledge as Power

In Genesis 2, we find only harmony, equality, and
community. The man and the woman stand "naked" and
"not ashamed" before their Creator. But already by
Genesis 3:7, the man and the woman are naked and
ashamed. Then, in Genesis 3:16, the Creator tells the
woman, "your desire shall be for your husband, and he
shall rule over you." Innocence and community have given
way to self-consciousness and domination. The transition
from the one state to the other, from Eden to human
culture, is the partial result of the pursuit of knowledge as a
form of power.
More exactly, humankind's "first disobedience," as
Milton called it, involves the illicit grasp of knowledge in
order to become divine. The serpent introduces the
interrogative mode into paradise. Questions. The woman
answers, thinks critically, judges, misjudges, sees, hungers,
seeks wisdom, aspires to deity. Grasps. Eats. Violates
limits. Disobeys. So far as we can tell, the man participates
fully with her in this extremely complicated process. " ...
She took of its fruit and ate; and she also gave some to her
husband, and he ate." The narrative here defies reduction
to any simple doctrinal formulation about the
fundamental character of or motive for human
disobedience. The lust of the eyes may well be involved, as
St. Augustine insisted, but so is critical reasoning,
autonomous judgment, and presumption . And, what is
often forgotten, the humans really do achieve something
very significant in the eyes of their Creator: "Behold, the
[hu]man has become like one of us, knowing good and evil
The great paradox of the story is that what we regard
as sources of human glory-freedom, critical reasoning,
autonomous judgment, quasi-divine knowledge-become
the sources of human shame. Self-consciousness, in its
double sense of self-awareness and embarrassment, comes
into being: "Then the eyes of both were opened, and they
knew that they were naked." Whatever else the Genesis
story may teach us, it at least teaches us this, that the
sources of the most profound human miseries and failures
are somehow bound up with the sources of the most
glorious human achievements. This tragic dimension to
human existence involves the failure of human beings to
accept their common humanity. It is, in brief, the impious
quest for knowledge.
For our purposes here, the most important point of
the story is this: the pursuit of knowledge-as-power disrupts
community and dis-orders the cosmos. Male domination,
for example, arises in the story, not as a divine prescription
for how human life ought to be lived, nor as a divine
punishment for transgression. Rather, it is one of the
several immediate consequences of human creation, of the
kind of dis-orderly world that the woman and the man and
the serpent have brought upon themselves. Gender
conflict and inequality are a small part of a much larger
pattern of disharmony that includes enmity between
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humans and other animals, a struggle between humans
and the vegetable world, and the replacement of life by
death. Male rule over females is not sanctioned by the
creator as a kind of recipe for order; instead, it is one of
the several marks of dis-order that characterize the cultural
world (the world that the humans have made) as opposed
to the divinely ordered world (the world as it emerged
originally from the hands of its Creator).
Knowledge-as-power destroys community through an
exceptionally subtle process. After they have eaten from
the tree of knowledge, the humans first hide themselves
from one another, fashioning aprons for themselves,
before they then hide together from the Creator. Having
tasted of divinity, securing the knowledge that they are and
have always been exposed and vulnerable together, the
woman and the man strive instantly to conceal that
vulnerability. It is an endeavor that leads directly to
estrangement between them. By the time that the Lord
God fmds them out, they are already quarreling, accusing,
distrusting. The battle between the sexes takes place in the
action of the story before the Creator announces that it
will become a part of human life.
The story thus charts in a very careful manner a
movement from one kind of loneliness to completed
human community to disobedience to loss of complete
community to another kind of loneliness. Thus, this
narrative sequence, whose midpoint involves the aspiration
to be divine, is framed by two very different kinds of
separation from the divine. In the first instance, the Lord
God observes that humanity is alone, solitary by virtue of
the distance between Creator and creature. In the second
instance, the humans observe that they have estranged
themselves from the Creator, having already estranged
themselves from each other and having thus undone the
divine remedy for the solitary condition of original
humanity.
Needless to say, the second state of separation is
worse than the first. Pardoxically worse-naturally. For
the human aspiration to divinity includes, among other
things, the desire for autonomy and self-sufficiency, a
denial both of creatureliness and of the fundamental
human need for community. But in becoming "like God,"
the humans discover for themselves that "it is not good the
human should be alone." Unfortunately, in the course of
discovering this, the humans also become so fully aware of
their vulnerability that they forever seek to conceal it. And
in seeking to conceal it, they fatally jeopardize the
possibility of that full community that their nakedness
made possible, even necessary, in the beginning.
Christian Higher Education in a Disordered World
The end of the story in Genesis 2-3 does suggest that
human beings are powerless by themselves to return to
Eden . The human condition does seem permanently
flawed by the conflicts that mark both our inner and outer,
our psychological and our social, lives. Indeed, the
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conditions described in Genesis 3 seem so fraught with
difficulty that mortality seems more a blessing than a curse.
But if Genesis 3 diagnoses and describes our present
predicament, Genesis 2 still remains the horizon of our
hopes. It is one thing to say that we are permanently
flawed, quite another to suggest that we should act to
deepen and maintain those flaws as though they were
divinely ordained. And, of course, we do not act this way
for the most part. We do not suggest that we should not
act to alleviate human suffering. Nor do we ordinarily
argue that leisure is an evil, since we were meant to labor
and struggle.
To some degree, higher learning must therefore
include a range of research efforts for the relief of
humanity's estate. And these worthy ambitions will surely
involve, to some extent, the pursuit of knowledge as a form
of power over dis-ordered natural processes. Even so, if we
are mindful of the teaching of Genesis, we can carry these
enterprises responsibly forward if and only if they are
advanced by human beings who are imbued with a sense of
limits. This sense of limits will entail a kind of piety. But it
will also engage our natural capacity to live nobly in the
midst of ambiguities and paradoxes of the kind that inform
the Genesis story of our collective condition. Finally, this
sense of limits will be less a moment of insight and more of
a spiritual virtue cultivated by practices of teaching and
learning that aspire to re-create the companionable
community that was the first object of human thought.

An scholars are exiles from Eden; indeed, all human
beings are in this condition. None can escape the
dialectics of Eden that, as we have seen, continue in the
West to shape the aspirations and the fears of the religious
and the non-religious alike. Many of the successes of the
technological project of mastery make us all feel less rather
than more in control of our destinies. Moreover, a purely
techno-logical education fractures community by obscuring
the social dimensions of knowledge and by replacing the
quest for truth with a quest for power. For some, the
ensuing sense of chaos leads to desperate efforts, many of
them artistic, to make the world all over again and so to
control it totally through a kind of deliberate selfdeception. Others resign themselves to a distinctively
modern kind of permanent estrangement, marked by a
tendency to regard the world as object and the self as an
alien presence in but not of it. The modern research
university or the modern seminary, insofar as they give
themselves over entirely to the project of Wissenschaft, of
"mastering all things by calculation" allow themselves to
become the principal institutional agents of these dubious
enterprises.
The principal heresy of modernism, the one that
animates the research university, is, like all heresies, not so
much a falsehood as an obsessive exaggeration of one truth
to the point of distortion. The Weberian emphasis upon
the making of meaning explains in part why cultural
anthropology has become the latest in a long series of
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organized intellectual e ndeavors that have occupied,
however temporarily, the position of queen of the
academic disciplines. It bases this claim to supremacy not
at all upon the prospe ct of synthesis, as theology and
philosophy once did, but upon its wholly legitimate
possession of the form of analysis best suited to modern
pluralism-the semiotically informed interpretation of the
myriad of meanings that allegedly constitute human life as
we know and live it.
However vital and important this endless task of
interpretation might be, it cannot be the whole of
education. If it is the whole, the whole is then a mere
heap, an assemblage of cultural inventories and linguistic
practices, and we must all agree with Henry Adams who
thought, after a time, that education was mere mastery of a
certain set of tools like languages and mathematics. We
will come also to agre e fully with Perry who thinks of
education as training in the making of meaning and yet
who wonders why, given this understanding, the university
should produce so many disaffected multiplists.

But matters are somewhat more complicated than
this, and these complications will bring us directly to both a
series of challenges and a series of opportunities for
Christian academics. My selection of the creation story in
Genesis and my particular reading of that story
demonstrate that one cannot be "religious in general," but
that one must speak, as I have thus far spoken, from out of
a particular religious tradition. As it happens, that
tradition tends to construe the world, including the part of
it discussed here as academic life, as good but systemically
flawed, as animated by a range of noble ideals and
aspirations but unable fully to realize them, as
simultaneously graced and dis-graced. Moreover, the
sense of vocation I have advanced here depends upon a
sense of a cosmos that is not of our own making. A calling,
in the full sense of the word, requires a call that comes to
us from a God who calls us first to himself and who calls us
as well to our respective tasks in the world.
Though Genesis is sacred scripture to me as a
Christian, I offer my re ading of it here, not as an antimodern tract, one that would correct Adams, Joyce, and
Weber, by returning us to some original state of relative
purity. Instead, I read it as, among other things, a
cautionary tale about the powers and limits of human
knowledge and human reason, one that should make us
equally suspicious of the arrogance of modernity and of
wholesale rej e ctions of modernity in the name of some
version or another of an educational fantasy . Since I
worship a God who called His creation "good" and who,
because He "so loved the world," continues to redeem it
through the actions of human beings in history, I cannot
but love that small portion of the world I have been
criticizing thus far.
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Academics at church-related schools should take
heart from all of this. Church-related colleges and
universities are, in their corporate vocations, very well
placed to advance a conception of the academic vocation
that is much more capacious and therefore much less
heretical than the one that dominates the secular academy.
I have begun to develop such a conception here from
reflections upon the sources of the Christian tradition. We
are, in short, called, I believe, as scholars and teachers to
serve, through our learning, the church and the world.
As such, our tasks as Christian academics should
include at least the following endeavors:
1. To cultivate in ourselves and others those virtues
that flow from faith, virtues like charity, humility, piety, and
hospitality.
2. To demonstrate in word and deed that these
virtues are indispensable to learning in the highest and
best sense of the word, that they are not only consistent
with the most rigorous forms of inquiry but essential to
them.
3. To restore to the discourse of the academic
community those "ultimate and most sublime" questions
that Weber and his heirs sought to banish from our
common life.
4. To insist that learning flourishes best in
community and that the Christian tradition has much to
teach us about how to order communities of inquiry.
5. To be as interested in the limits of knowledge as
we are in its powers.
6. Finally, to stress the connection between learning
and service, while understanding both of these as gifts of
the God in whom we live and move and have our being,
the God who first loved us thereby enabling us to love
others in His name.
In seeking to do all of this, we must uphold one
another always and we must insist that our collective task
really does involve the pursuit of the truth of matters. We
might well in all of this adopt as our motto the great saying
of St. Bernard of Clairvaux: "Some seek knowledge for the
sake of knowledge; that is curiosity; others seek knowledge
that they may themselves be known; that is vanity; but there
are some who seek knowledge in order to serve and edify
others, and that is charity" (quoted by Pieper, 89). May we
seek this charity as we continue to reflect upon Christianity
and our callings as academics. 0
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The End of the Silent Era
For a while, on Sundays, even the old
Stopped aging. Years in blue permanent,
A decade in the charcoal suit, each seat
By de facto reservation. But when
The deaths arrived, they came like crocuses,
Pushing pastels toward those pews, opening
The aisles to prayers for primary colors.
Which rushed so rapidly, he thought, waiting
For another dark and light hymn to end,
Of the new note book of George Stathakis,
Who wanted to write while he barrel-rolled
Niagara, who suffocated behind
The Falls, leaving each page blank beside him.
He thought of refrigerators and trunks
Open to children and closed like cases
With smoking guns. The Amens, the AmensHe thought of the leer ofNosferatu,
Caligari's smile, how they kept his eyes
From following the explanatory
Captions while they opened slowly the lids
And doors which protected fragile slumbers.

Gary Fincke
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Truth and the
Universities
Arthur F. Holmes. Shaping Character:
Moral Education in the Christian College.
Eerdmans, 1991. 82 pp., $7.95.
This book was written out of
Holmes' experience as chair of "Ethics
Across the Curriculum," a recent
project of the Christian College
Consortium. No doubt it also reflects
his experience teaching ethics for
some three decades in a Christian
college. In this he distinguished
himself, not so much for originality,
but for clarity, fairness and balance he
embodied in and out of the classroom.
This latest little book bespeaks these
traits.
Holmes begins with a clear and
succinct repudiation of value
neutrality. Furthermore, he notes, the
myth of value neutrality has caused
significant damage in the universities,
for it has left "specialists" in the
sciences and elsewhere with little idea
of what teaching ethics involves. The
book is written primarily to colleagues
such as these, nonspecialists in ethics
or philosophy. In simple form, his
question is what are the steps Christian
colleges and teachers might take in
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shaping character? In answer, Holmes
proposes a schema divided in three
phases: (1) the student's conscience
must be raised and formed, (2) her
decision-making skills honed and (3)
her character developed. Four middle
chapters, the apparent meat of the
book, are given over to the proposal of
the schema and the sequential
development of each of its phases.
While at points it is helpful, there
are difficulities with the schema and
how it is developed. These begin with
a curious turnabout in chapter two
where the schema is. first unfolded.
Here Holmes begins by criticizing
modem individualism but then turns,
mainly favorably, to contemporary
theories of moral development which
seem to presume it. The difficulties
continue into the final phase,
concerning less this phase in itself,
more its relation to the previous two.
Phase three involves "the formation of
a stable and predictable agent who can
behave responsibly." (70) In discussing
this phase, Holmes turns to the virtue
thinking of Aristotle and Aquinas,
which makes us wonder if we should
have heard more of this earlier,
especially since this is a book on
shaping Christian character and
Aquinas (among others) has written at
length on how that character is
acquired. Why, in other words, is
"consciousness raising" and schooling
in "decision making" crucial-and why
have full chapters been devoted to
them-if the third phase involves so
centrally the real concerns of morality,
and apparently of this book? Holmes
appears to hope to combine two sides
of a raging debate between
proponents of character ethics and
rational decision-making ethics, but
arrive finally at character. I, for one,
wish he had been a bit more critical of
the modem legacy of decision-making
procedures and developmental
psychologies which led us away from
the character emphasis, even as he
means (rightly, I think) to lead us back
to it.
Such criticism might have freed
him further to develop some fine
insights which arise in those parts of
the book where his schema holds a

looser grip, as in this final section on
developing character. For example, he
comments in passing on the
importance of an appropriate worship
environment on a Christian college
campus for fostering moral education,
or he emphasizes the need for
Christian students to be "soaked" in
the language and standpoint of the
Bible if they are to see with moral eyes.
These together with the underlying
concern, frequently expressed, that
moral education is rightly the province
of all in the Christian college, not just
the specialists in ethics, deserve a
hearing and make Holmes' book well
worth the short time it will take the
nonspecialist-or even the specialistto peruse its pages.
Charles Pinches

Diogenes Allen. Christian Belief in a
Postmodern World : The Full Wealth of
Conviction.
Louisville,
KY:
Westminster/John Knox Press, 1989.
238 pp., $15.95 pbk.
So protean is the term,
"postmodem" that one could imagine
any number of very different books
bearing the same title as Diogenes
Allen's latest apologetic work. In this
case, Allen uses the term to denote our
changed intellectual circumstance
after the collapse of Enlightenment
certitudes, especially those relatng to
the objectivity and sufficiency of the
natural sciences. Allen argues that, in
our brave new postmodern world,
Christians should shake off their
centuries-old defensiveness, lay claim
to "the full wealth of conviction" with a
clear intellectual conscience, and
reassert the centrality of religious
questions in all precincts of the
academy.
In the five chapters of Part One,
"The Book of Nature," Allen argues
that, in spite of centuries of bad blood
between natural science and religion,
current science points beyond itself to
the possibility of God. That is, though
science does not demonstrate that
The Cresset

there is a God, it repeatedly raises at its
limits the question of God so that no
person of intellectual integrity can
simply ignore the issue. Allen
reexamines the Galileo controversy,
argues that religion and science offer
complementary rather
than
competing accounts of the cosmos,
and revamps the cosmological and
teleological arguments as suggestions
rather than demonstrations of the
divine. He concludes this part by
arguing that the human need to order
hierarchically our conflicting goals
makes the question of God's existence
unavoidable insofar as we attempt to
live rationally.
Part Two, "The Book of
Scripture," explores how a responsibly
rational person can proceed from the
question of God to faith without blind
leaps and fideistic plunges. For Allen,
faith is not simply assent to
propositions but an "actual interaction
with a reality." But this "actual
interaction" presupposes an openness,
a receptive orientation, on the part of
the believer-to-be. Allen notes that
this openness is very like William
James' notion of a live option, but
Allen associates himself most closely
with Austin Ferrer's notion of "initial
faith." It was the agenda of Part One to
show that sciene itself offers good
rational grounds for this initial faith.
In Part Two, Allen describes the ways
in which prayer, Bible study,
participation in the community of
faith, moral self-examination, and even
suffering can provide ample
experiential grounds for moving
beyond initial faith to "the full wealth
of conviction."
While Allen argues in Parts One
and Two that the postmodern scene is
more amenable to faith than was the
modern, he devotes his third and final
section to a postmodern sensibility
that is fundamentally inimical to his
resolute insistence of the truth of
Christian belief. Allen writes, "For an
increasing number of people today,
the chief obstacle to being fully
convinced of the truth of Christianity
is not a scientific view of the world that
has no room at all for religion but the
existence of rival religions. It seems to
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them that because there are so many
religions, it is not possible to make
exclusive claims about the truth of any
religion." ( 17) Allen, himself, is clearly
tom between an unwillingness to pare
Christianity back to some sort of
generic theism and an unwillingness to
assign all non-Christian religions to
the outer darkness. To resolve this
dilemma, he articulates "A Christian
Theology of Other Faiths." Allen
interestingly combines his conviction
that Christ is the decisive revelation of
God and a universalistic belief that
God has not left Godself without
witness in any time or place. Drawing
heavily on Simone Weil, Allen looks
sympathetically at other faiths and
finds there, in cipher, the cross.
Allen's theology of other faiths recalls
Tolkien on myth, but that connection
isn't here noted.
While Allen's book has definite
strengths, notably his expositions of
Weil on suffering and on other
religions, there are real weaknesses as
well. By casting his net so widely, Allen
necessarily sacrifices thoroughness.
Each chapter sketches an argument
that cries out for book length
treatment. For example, in the twelve
pages of Chapter One, he tries both to
show that science is rooted in the
Judea-Christian conception of the
cosmos and to reinterpret the
confrontation between Galileo and the
Catholic Church. Given his space
limitation, it is hardly surprising that
his account of these topics is
disappointingly thin. In numerous
other chapters, as well, Allen offers
brief summaries of arguments
developed by others rather than
original contributions to on-going
debates.
Finally, I must express a real
ambivalence about Allen's book. In
spite of its title, it often seems to hark
back to the past more than it looks
ahead to a postmodern future. Allen's
emphasis on teleological and
cosmological arguments, even when
modified as pointers to God, are more
redolent of the 18th century than the
21st. And is the Galileo affair really so
significant a roadblock to belief today
that it demands the pride of place

Allen bestows upon it? Also, Allen's
suggestion that, with the crumbling of
Enlightenment presuppositions,
religious questions will reemerge at
the center of academic disciplines
strikes me as more nostalgic than
realistic. The modern university,
characterized as it is by technocratic
specialization, seems hardly the place
to incubate a renewal of religious
thought. But I must admit that in my
own discipline, the rejection of
foundationist epistemology coincided
with the formation of The Society of
Christian Philosophers, a vigorous
community of philosophical reflection
that rather nicely corresponds to
Allen's prognostications. Still, the
current intellectual scene strikes me as
largely hostile to any suggestions of
transcendence or ultimate truth. (An
excellent illustration of this hostility is
to be found in Gary Lease's review of
Allen's book in The Journal of
Eucmenical Studies [1990] where Lease
labels any assertion of the ultimate
truth of Christianity a "hegemonic
privileging" that leads necessarily to
"theocratic totalitarianism.") Allen
occasionally notes this aggresive
relativisim but only responds to it in
the brief third part of his book. And
his discovery of Christian verities in
non-Christian religions would confirm
rather than remove suspicion that
Allen's "full wealth of conviction" is
incompatible with a genuinely
postmodern sensibility. I suspect that,
despite Allen's optimism, Christians
will find the postmodern world fully as
hostile as the modern was.

George Connell

R. William Franklin and Joseph M.
Shaw, The Case for Christian Humanism.
Eerdmans, 1991.
Valparaiso University has begun a
new formal conversation on its
Lutheran character. Our neighbors up
the road in South Bend have again
been scrutinizing their identity as a
Roman Catholic institution. Many of
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us sense that the Christian character of
church-related
colleges
and
universities continues to wane even as
we fuss more about it. We who are
administrators feel both the pitfalls
and promises of this project. I say
"project" because addressing issues of
Christian character may call for a fairly
elaborate institutional response.
One helpful commentary is
Franklin and Shaw's The Case for
Christian Humanism because it focuses
on the notion of the Christian
community to make the case for
humanism. The book counters the
devaluing of humanism by the
Christian anti-humanists who confine
faith to privatism or misguided
nationalism and by the anti-Christian
humanists who reject Christianity as
misguided mysticism. Christian
humanism is rooted in the Hebrew
Scriptures, the authors observe, which
"assumes the community as a given,
whereas modern culture thinks the
individual is the given and thus
regards the community as a task to be
achieved." Christian humanism is
conceived broadly as the "the deep
interest in human beings, their life,
well-being, culture, and eternal
significance, that belongs to the
Christian faith."
One of our tasks is to reconceive
how to nurture the learning
community
as
a
Christian
community-unlike the research
university, which as a forum for
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learning may admit a model of
community only via the cells of
campus ministry or student clubs.
Franklin and Shaw lay out before us
the rich tradition of Christian
humanism in the West, with lrenaeus
as a pivot point for understanding that
our humanity must always be fleshed
out in community. Fr. Hesburgh says,
"A liberal education should enable a
person to humanize everything that he
or she touches in life." This book
identifies that humanizing power in
the Christian community, especially
the church.
We talk about being a
community of learning and a
community of faith, but the nurturing
of the community of faith is often
more passive than active, especially
among faculty and staff who give shape
to the community for students. The
history of Christian humanism
outlined by Franklin and Shaw sets
forth challenging models to clarify key
questions. Unfortunately, the case
studies cited rarely come from the
academy, but they evoke interesting
comparisons for us especially as
Franklin and Shaw recite the
"eucharistic model of community"
erupting across 19th century Europe
and America-the Oxford Movement,
the Benedictine Revival, the Iona
Community, St. John's in Collegeville.
Franklin and Shaw wish to argue that
Christian humanism propels corporate
action.
The authors take on too many
tasks to argue their base-the book
concludes with a diffuse section on the
doctrines of God, Christ, and Spirit.
Academics will look for more attention
to the university as the historic
instrument for Christian humanism or
to more careful distinctions in
Renaissance humanism and less
attention to theological footnotes,
which
are
plentiful.
The
"Bibliographical Essay" at the end,
however, is convincingly thorough and
useful.
Franklin and Shaw build a sturdy
case for the centrality of worship in
community as the heartbeat of
Christian humanism, not the periodic
returns to classical texts inspiring the

dignity and freedom of the individual.
This abiding interest in the renewal of
Christian community can refresh our
thinking about the prospects for the
Christian learning community.
Philip K. Gilbertson

Of interest .••
George M. Marsden and Bradley J .
Longfield, The Secularization of the
Academy. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1992. Mark Schwehn reports
that this book contains a selection of
interesting historical essays on aspects
of "the remarkable revolution from a
little over a century ago, when
Christianity was a leading force in
higher eduction, to today, when at
most it is tolerated as a peripheral
enterprise and often is simply
excluded." The last essay in the
volume is a very useful bibliographical
essay, "Christianity and the University
in America: A Bibliographical Essay,"
by D. G. Hall, pp. 303-309. Professor
Schwehn will review this book for The
Cresset in the fall of 1992.

On Poets...

Jill Baumgaertner is a member of the
Department of English at Wheaton
College, a Lilly Fellow Network school.
Her anthology Poetry is a popular item
on the list for Harcourt, Brace. She
was for many years Poetry Editor for
The Cresset, and is presently an Editor
at Large for The Christian Century.
Gary Fincke teaches English and
coaches men's tennis at Susquehanna
University. His book, The Double
Negatives of the Living was published in
March of this year by Zoland Press.
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NETWORK OF
CHURCH-RELATED
COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES

To provide a national forum for
exploring and discussing issues of common
interest to institutions in church-related higher
education, the Lilly Fellows Program has
established a network of church-related colleges
and universities that represent a diversity of
denominational traditions, institutional types,
and geographical locations.
The charter members of this network are:
Augustana College ~ Baylor University ~ Berea
College ~ Bethune-Cookman College ~ Boston
College ~ Calvin College ~ College of St.
Benedict~ College of St. Catherine~ Davidson
College ~ Fisk University ~ Furman University
~
Goshen College ~ Loyola Marymount
University ~ Luther College ~ Marquette
University ~ Messiah College ~ Pepperdine
University ~ Saint Mary's College ~ Saint Olaf
College ~University of Notre Dame~ University
of the South ~ Valparaiso University ~ Villanova
University~ Wheaton College~ Whitworth
College ~ Wilberforce University ~ Xavier
University of Louisiana. Each year of the project
the network will be expanded by approximately
five additional schools.
Representatives from these ins ti tu tions
will meet at Valparaiso University for an annual
fall conference. Additionally, several workshops
and mini-conferences will be scheduled annually
on the campuses of the network institutions. A
biannual newsletter will report network
activities, provide listings of young scholars
interested in teaching at church-related
institutions, and include proceedings from
conferences and workshops.
Finally, each year the Program will
sponsor one Senior Fellow, selected from
nominees from the network schools, to spend the
year on the Valparaiso University campus,
working closely with the Lilly Fellows Program.
The Senior Fellow will engage in research and
writing, serve as a resource person for the
Postdoctoral Fellows, participate in a year-long
colloquium, and contribute to the annual
conference the following fall. Dr. Lee Hardy from
Calvin College has been appointed as Senior
Fellow for 1992-93.

POSTDOCTORAL
FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM

Each academic year, a group of three
Postdoctoral Fellows will be appointed for twoyear periods . Candidates for these fellowships
should be interested in considering the
relationship between Christianity and the
academic vocation and in pursuing careers at
church-related colleges or universities. The three
Fellows who will begin their terms in 1992-93
have already been appointed.
To enrich their postdoctoral experience,
these fellows will teach five to seven courses over
a two-year period in their discipline and/or the
interdisciplinary program in Christ College, the
Honors College at Valparaiso University. A
senior mentor from the Fellow's discipline or
Christ College will work closely with each
Fellow.
The Program also provides research
opportunities for scholarly or creative work in the
Fellow's field and in issues related to Christianity
and the academic vocation.
An ongoing weekly colloquium will be
conducted as an integral component of the Lilly
Fellows Program. Participants will include the
Postdoctoral Fellows, the Senior Fellow, the
Project or Program Director, the Mentors, and
other interested faculty at Valparaiso University.
The Colloquium provides the participants with
the occasion for sustained reflection about
Christianity, the Christian vocation of teaching,
and the church-related academy; it encourages
fellowship and provides mutual support for the
participants in the Program; and it encourages
and nurtures the spiritual formation of the
Postdoctoral Fellows.

Through sustained interaction with the
Senior Fellows and through participation in
network activities, the Postdoctoral Fellows will
become familiar with the landscape of churchrelated higher education; and the Program
Director will provide them with post-Fellowship
career planning and placement at network
schools and other church-related institutions. 0
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has been established to address two critical problems faced by church-related
institutions of higher learning in the United States. First, though many churchrelated colleges and universities are seeking to recover or refortify a sense of
purpose and identity, there has been no sustained national conversation that is
expressly designed to renew and deepen a sense of corporate vocation among
these schools. Second, settings for the formation of younger scholars who wish to
pursue their vocational commitments at church-related colleges and universities
scarcely exist in the United States. In brief, the hegemony of the secular research
university has gradually eroded both institutional and individual senses of
Christian vocation, leaving many schools and many Christian scholars in need of
renewed vision and mutual support.
The Lilly F~~lows Program therefore consists of two distinct but integrated
programma\!C initiatives. First, it has established and will steadily expand a
national network of church-related institutions of higher learning and sustain
a,mong tnem a discussion of Christian understandings of the nature of the
. .J"'<:ademic vocation. Second, it offers several young scholars in the humanities and
. ,}he arts a chance to renew and deepen their sense of vocation, to enrich their
t :ppstdoctoral intellectual and spiritual life within a Christian community of
·.::. learning. They will thereby be prepared, through a variety of closely considered
classroom teaching experiences, through participation in a weekly colloquium,
and through regular association with mentors, to seek permanent employment
within church"related institutions of higher learning. The two programs together
bring focus, clarity, and energy to a critical aspect of a much larger project: the
imaginative reformulation and implementation of an agenda for church-related
higher learning for the twenty-first century.
PURPOSES
1. To generate a national discussion about the relationship of Christianity and the
academic vocation.

2. To encourage and support research and publication about various aspects of
faith and learning, the Christian vocation of teaching, and church-related higher
education.

FAX: (219) 464-5496

3. To create a network of church-related institutions interested in exploring these
issues.
Arlin G. Meyer
Program Director

Margaret Franson
Assistant to the Program Director

Mark Schwehn
Project Director

4. To identify and publicize highly qualified Christian scholars who seek to pursue
their academic vocations in church-related contexts.
5. To nurture intellectual and spiritual virtues in young scholars as they prepare
for teaching careers in church-related institutions.
6. To prepare academic leaders to serve in institutions with a strong sense of
Christian identity and mission.
(continued on inside back cover)

